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INTRODUCTION
Wherever one looks, be it Russia, Spain or Mexico, the relation of Church and S:&a.-te holds the center of
the stage.

Nor is the United States any exception.

Yet

'.

it has often been assumed by all too many Americans that
the question of this relation of Church and State, which
under other forms of political organization has proved so
baffling, has been finally and forever settled in our
country through the wisdom of the framers of our Federal
Constitution.

Unfortunately, the matter is not so simple.

There are many points at which, in fact, the true relation
proves difficult to define.
For many, relation in no way connotes complete
separation.

In Church and state, the Catholic sees not

merely institutions, but the spiritual and temporal poles
of all human life, individual and social, expressions of a
duality to be found in every sphere, reflecting the concomitance of sense life and spiritual life in man.

The

distinction between them'is never absolute, for they arer
made up of human individuals and reflect the complexity of
human minds; their action is interweaving, the one consoli-

1

i1

dating something of what the other conceives.

Some Protes-

tants too, are quite in agreement that Church and State cannot be divorced.

For once a man confesses belief in God, and
,

.

thus, in an absolute norm of moralft;, he should logically
admit that politics and economics come under the moral law.
Christopher Dawson in his Religion anf

~

State, frequently

reminds us that "business and politics belong to the sphere
of the relative, while religion is the fixed pole on which
human life revolves and to which all parts must be related tt • l
In the United States, unhappily, our political
representatives are too often oblivious of any connection between the spiritual and temporal orders.

An iron curtain

has been dropped between Church and State, separate fields
of operation have been marked out for each of them.

The

Church to influence the State must now descend to the level
of lobbying like any politician or big business agent, for
the pressure of potential votes serves as a marvelous spur
for moving a Congressional member to action.

Fortunately,

for the interest of religion and morality, the Church has
the religious press at her disposal.
1

Christopher Dawson, Religion and the State, Sheed and
Ward, New York, 1935, 124.

,--iii
To obtain some appreciation of this indirect relation between Church and State, a definite period would have
to be studied and all the elements examined
as they are
.
~~

mixed into the political pot in which the governing power's
policy is brewed.

Many times, these elements, like the

causes of a disastrous fire, are as
of the resulting ruin.

'~distinguishable

ashes

The formula, however, of Woodrow

Wilson's Mexican Policy has been sufficiently preserved
through records, documents and newspapers, so that an analysis of it will reveal in large measure the political, economic and religious elements contained therein.

Mexico, more-

over, during this period of Wilson's Administration absorbed
the interest of her northern neighbor, for its rich resources and unsettled condition served as a magnet to at-

~

tract the exploiting capitalist and Protestant missionary,
who dreamed of luring Catholic Mexicans away from the Faith
of their fathers.

In addition, revolution, religious perse-

cution and the conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism
forced

th~

religious issue into a prominent position.

Along

with the interests of the statesman and capitalist, Wilson
also had to consider those of the Churchman.

There were,

though, many sincere persons, both within the Church and

,

iiii
without, who with the best will in the world, conceived the
interests of the Church differently_

The Catholics and

protestants, by and large, ended up on the opposite sides
,

.

.9 4;

of the fence, with the result that our President during the
course of years was verbally pommelled from both sides, and
was stranded without any avenue open.for compromise.

This

division complicated the Church and State relations and considerably weakened any ultimate influence on the President's
policy making.
To better

un~erstand

the interplay of these dif-

ferent elements, a separate study of each will be made in
the following chapters.

After drawing the historical set-

ting of the principal political and economic considerations,
the conflicting views of the religious press will be
sketched one at a time on the same canvas.

The Mexican pic-

ture thus portrayed will enable us to view in a clearer
light the interests and justified concern of the Church as
J

well as its successes and failures in influencing State
policy_

CHAPTER I
WILSON'S MEXICAN POLICY
Without a consideration of Don Porfirio Diaz, a
,

.

~.

study ot any period of modern Mexican history would be incomplete, if not senseless.

This leader chose the proper

moment for jumping into the saddle, 'tnd once the reins were
in his control, he alone, was the driver tor over thirty
years.

These were the thirty years of the famed Porfirian

peace.

The nightmare of chaos between the downfall ot

Maximilian in 1867 and Diaz's accession in 1876 paved the
way tor the welcomed advent ot a strong ruler.
~

The Excel-

has well summed up that turn in Mexican government

rule in one of its editorials:
When President Diaz took
office for the second time, the
Mexican people had lost faith in
democratic institutions, in constitutional guarantees, in law
and order ••• They had only one aspiration: to be protected from
banditry on t~e high road and in
politics. Therefore, they lay
back in the arms of General Diaz. l
~

During the years of peace when the people "lay back in his
arms", Mexico progressed until she became the leading reI

Excelsior, Mexico City, Sept. 15, 1930. This was daily
paper with capable editors, among whom was Salado Alvarez.
1

2

public south of our border. 2
Diaz had his fingers on the pulse of the Mexican
people as he shaped his policy to make Mexico a safer place
for people to live.

.• 47

Foreigners too, were protected who

would bring in capital and technical training to develop as
quickly as possible "Mexico's fabulois resources and thus
advance the standard of living, especially for the ellte".3
His principle was one of expediency, with the Ten Commandments replaced by the creed of

laissez-~air!.

Yet it would

certainly be unjust to hold the great dictator personally
responsible for all the ugly abuses inherent in the system:
land distribution for instance.

During his regime the

number of individual holdings increased three hundred percent.

So when President Wilson took over affairs in 1914,
there were over 55,000 individual owners. 4 As Toribo
Henry F. Pringle, ~ Life ~ Times 2! William~. ~,
Farrar & ~inehart, New York, 1939, Vol. II, 700.
3 Samuel Flagg Bemis, Ib! Latin American Policy ~ la!
United States, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1943,

2

~69.

4

Toribo Esquivel Obregon, Influencia ~ Espana ~ les !itadosUnidos sobre Mexico, Madrid, ~ ed. Calleja,
19l.8, 322. Except otherwise noted, all the translatiOn
of Spanish works into English are the work of John Delmar, a resident of Mexico, who has contributed many articles to leading American periodicals.

3

Esquivel Obregon observes, such bright spots in the Diaz
regime have frequently been smudged by the dirt of enemy
propaganda:
Facts have bee~~deliber
ately misrepresented for the purpose of obtaining sympathy and
aid, more or less direct, from the
Anglo-American government for revolutionary movements. 6
OQtside Mexico, though, Diaz's friends far outnumbered his foes.

While still Theodore

Roosevelt's

secretary of State, Elihu Root in an exchange of encomia
in Mexico City probably sinned on the side of hyperbole in
referring to President Diaz as "one of the greatest men to
be held up for the hero worship of mankind'''. 6

Taft, how-

ever, more sanely evaluated Diazts real worth by saying,
"My own impression has been that Diaz

ha~

done more for

the people of Mexico than any other Latin American has done
for any of his people d • 7 His achievements from a material
standpoint command the extremest respect:

In 1880 Mexico

possessed but 430 miles of railroad, in 1911 it possessed
J

5
6

7

Ibid., 328.
r
Latin America ~ ~he !Inited states, Addresses IDL Elihu
Boot, Harvard University Press, 1917, 168.
Pringle, Taft, II, 700.

4

over

~5t488

miles; imports increased from $19,793,493 to

$205,874,273; exports skyrocketed from $27,318,788 to
$293,753,638.

The national income also naturally rose from

$19,776,638 to nearly $100,000,000:&; The Mexican nation
had prospered but a glance at the shameful wages indicated

,.

that the profits were going to someone else.

And this

Itsomeone else tf was the foreigner to whom Diaz had pawned his
nation's resources.

Such a regime was welcomed by the Amer-

ican financier seeking another Eldorado for his investments,
and he was 'more than eager to invest his capital, effort and
ingenuity in such a promising enterprise_

Within a quarter

of a century American investments totaled nearly a billion
and a half dOllars;9

English, German, French, Spanish, and

others, together owned another half a billion dollars.
tllndeed, foreign holdings totaled a greater value than native property, and of the foreign holdings citizens of the
United States owned more than all other foreigners combinedtt!O
I

8
9
10

Ernest Gruening, Mexico ~ Its Heritage, Century Company,
New York, 1928, 561.
~ouse ~2S. No. 305, 57 Cong. 2 sess_, I, 503.
Fall Committee Report II, 3322.
J. Fred Rippy, !hi Unit~ Stat~s ~~exico, Alfred
Knopf, New York, 1926, 312.

5

Americans owned 78% of the mines, 72% of the smelters, 58%
of the oil; and 68% of the rubber industry, while the total
Mexican wealth was just half of her ~orthern neighbor,
.......,
11
$792,187,242.
Yet all was not well with Mexico, for a portion of
the educated aristocracy was

becomin~irritated

by the can-

ker of foreign exploitation, especially when the influential
and high-salaried positions were going to foreigners.

Bemis

well indicates their disturbed state of mind at the invaders
boldness:
Their proprietary character,
their dynamic energy, their protestant outlook, disturbed and
alarmed some of the disinterested
creole aristocracy, despite the
excellence of diplomatic relations
between the governments. With
grossly exaggerated fears this patriotic elite felt that eventuall!2
Mexico might go the way of Texas. .
The older generation, with the exception of the
I

above mentioned clique, had experienced the chaos that proceeded the dictator's regime, and they were content for the
most part with conditions as they were, but their children
wanted to realize their democratic political aspirations.
11
12

aQuse Qg£., op. cit. 3322, 3313.
Bemis, 170.

~~------------------~
6

yet the discontentment of the small group of aristocrats was
sufficient to strike the spark that ignited the keg of po-

..

litical opposition among the younge: generation against
Diaz t s despotic government.

~;

D1az, now an old man, no longer"

could "play his supporters off against one another before
they could develop sufficient strengj,h to oppose himtt.I3
The General admitted this in March, 1908, in the widely published Creelman interview which quoted him to the effect
that the Mexican people were ready for democracy, and he
went on to add:
••• he would welcome the formation of a poli,tical party which
should put forward an opposition
candidate; that he would surrender the power to such a candidate if legally elected. 14
The challenge was accepted and the "Democratic
Party" was formed.

Francis I. Madero, a member 0f the

wealthy privileged class wrote a pamphlet entitled,

~

suc,esion Qresidencial !!l 1910 (The Presidential Succession
in 1910), stressing the feature of no ree,lections for presidency.

This little work not only won him the favor of t~e

growing Democratic Party, but also the nomination for presi13 Herbert Ingram Priestley, Ih! Mexican ~ation, A Historx,
Macmillan Company, New York, 1923, 380.
14 Creelman, James; President g~, ~ £! 1h! America's,
in Pearson's Magazine, Vol. XIX, March, 1908, 231.

7

dency in the promised elections.

15

A p1at:rorm was adopted

stressing many democratic re:rorms long since abandoned, such
as restoration o:r the Constitution, :reedom o:r the press,
.10 .;"

promotion of education and wider suffrage.
However, when the time came, General Diaz did not
retire from office, but the 'tOld Chie,t had let it be known
that he would again respond to pressure

ana

go through the

torm of another election in spite of the Creelman interview".16

Even his enemies admitted his motives were patri-

otic, since no one could deny the hard truth of one of his
tormer statements on the same issue:
I have tried to leave the
presidency several times, but it
has been pressed upon me and I
remained in office for the sake
o:r the nation which trusted me.
The fact that the price of Mexican securities dropped eleven
points when I was ill at Cuernavca indicates the kind of evidence
that persuaded me to overcome my
personal inclinations to retire
to private life. 17
The masses still might have favored the dictator's

.

reelection, if he had not coromi tted a political el;'ror of the
15

George B. Winton, lI.!exico, Past and Present, Cokesbury
Press, Nashville, 1928, 170:----16 Wilfrid H. Calcott, Liberalism ~ Mexico, !§§1-~,
Stanford University Press, 1931, 171.
17 Creelman, 237.

8

first magnitude in arresting Madero on the charge of plotting rebellion. I8

Madero soon escaped over the border into

the United states, where

he tormulated his revolutionary
,

plans.

.

When his plan of San Luis ~otosi was issued, it

gained many adherents, among whom were the bandits, Villa in
the North, and Zapata, leader of the'jeons, in the South. 19
The Federal troops were repulsed and the frontier town of
Ciudad Juarez was taken on the ninth of May, 1911.

General

Diaz saw the handwriting on the wall and resigned with the
announcement that he took tfthis step to spare the country
bloodshed, the exhaustion of its credit, the destruction of
its resources and the risk of international complications lf •

20

However, at the very moment when negotiation-s
were going on in Mexico for peace betore Diaz,I s resignation,
"alleged fl representatives of the Standard Oil Company were
effecting a contract with the Madero revolutionary junta in
Texas, and offering this faction a substantial loan of money.
The details of this transaction have never been

full~

di-

Edward I. Bell, Ih! Political Shame 2f Mexico, McBride
Hast & Co., New York, 37.
~
19 Priestley, 398.
20 Francisco Bulnes, ~ Whole Truth About Mexico, M.
Bulnes Book Co., New York, 1916, 168.
18

.9

vulged.

Numerous intimations and allegations have been made

to the effect that the Standard Oil Company was responsible
for the success of the Madero revolution--all
based ostens.
,

ibly upon this presumed deal.

.;J. .;,

Testimony tending to confirm

this suspicion was brought out in the Senate investigation
of Mexican Affairs in 1919, but proot of collusion was distinctly lacking.
The first substantial inkling that there may have
been a tie-up between Madero and the Standard Oil Company
was brought out by the American Ambassador, H. L. Wilson,
in a public address delivered on the night of January 6,
1914.

On his own responsibility Wilson charged that
••• it would be a big surprise in
certain quarters if it should be
known that certain international
interests were suggesting the
United States policy purs~ed during the last six months. 2

The State Department Archives in Washington recently made
available all the documentary material pertaining to the
Madero Revolution.

The secret reports to which the Ambassa-

dor refers" have been located and carefully examined.

Th~e

memoranda disclose the fact that certain dubious transactions were certainly made respecting the offer of between
$500,000 to $1,000,000 by representatives of the Standard
2~

~

York

~imes,

January 7, 1914.

,

-10

Oil Company to the Madero insurrectos, but they do not indicate whether the money was ever received or forwarded by the
standard.

It was a well known fact, however, that Madero

entered into peace negotiations wit~~the Diaz Government in
order to stall for time.

He desired to utilize the lull to

reorganize his forces, and raise monel' which was vitally
needed tor the continuance of the revolution.

The mere

prospect ot a SUbstantial loan, therefore, may have been
sufficient to induce Madero to declare an end to all peace
discussions.

It is the timing of the loan which gives rise

to the suspicions that there may have been an understanding
between Madero and the Standard Oil Company.
The details of the loan transaction between the
representative of the Standard Oil Company and the Madero
insurrectos is contained in a memorandum written on April
19, 1911, by S. W. Finch, Chief of the Bureau of Investigation, and submitted to the Attorney General.

Finch included

in his memorandum extracts of a report of one of the special
agents

tha~

undertook the investigation on the spot.

The

informant of the special agent disclosed the following:
pany
came
I am
this
give

Yesterday morning, in comwith my brother, a party
to us in the Sheldon Hotel.
personally acquainted with
party, but do not wish to
his name at the present time,

.'

11

but will inform you of same later.
I know him to be a representative
of the Standard Oil Company. He
asked me if I was not well acquainted with the heads of the insurrectos. I . told hi~
.
.., that I knew
a party here 1n El Paso who was
very close to all the officers of
all the insurrectos and then this
party asked me if I did not know
it to be a fact that t~e insurrectos were very short of money.
He then stated that he was representing a dompany who would furnish the insurrectos with from
$500,000 to $1,000,000 on the condition that the insurrectos would
issue to his company 6% gold bonds
and a certain concession which the
company would ask of the insurrectos. I asked him what kind of
a concession his company would ask,
and he answered by saying, "You
should know the nature of the concession wanted by the connection".
He then told us that if a meeting
was brought by us between him and
a party representing the insurrectos, and if they would agree
mutually on this concession, he
would make it paY2~s well for our
time and service.

.

The representative of the Standard, it was later revealed,
was a person by the name of C. R. Troxel.

The informant

•
22

Attorney General to Knox, April 28, 1911, State Dept. ---Arch.'
812.00 Mexican Despatches, VI, (File No. 812.00 1503).
Encloses Memorandum for the Attorney General written by
S. W. Finch, Chief of the Bureau of Investigation, which
contains extracts of a report of one of the special
agents dated April 19, 1911.

12

.'
relates that the matter was discussed by the Madero junta,
and it was decided that an appointment should be arranged a
few hours later at the Zeiger Hotel.
,

J. V. Smith acted as

.

the representative for the insurrett~s.

Smith and Troxel

consulted alone at the latter's suggestion in Smith's room.
Nothing is known of what took place. ,.Troxel appeared satisfied and Smith being shown a letter from John D•.Archbold of
23
Standard Oil authorizing the contract was enthusiastic.
Smith believed that Madero would approve of the
transaction, and the whole matter would be consummated in
a few days.

The reason for Standard Oil's concern in the

Mexican situation was explained by Smith.

He stated that

Standard's concessions recently had been cancelled by the
Mexican federal government and ftthey were now operating
through Waters Pierce Company".

Unreasonable taxes, however,

were being imposed upon Waters Pierce.

"Consequently, the

Standard Oil Company thought they would have better sailing
under the insurrectos form of government tt •
~'egotiations

continued wi th Madero appointing his

brother to represent his interests.

Apparently, a contract

was duly entered into and forwarded to Francisco Madero by
Troxel through a courier.
23

Ibid.

An answer was expected on the

,

13

night of April 28, 1911. 24

The secret service reports do not

state exactly what Madero's reply was.

From all available

information it is evident that Maderots reply would be in the
,

affirmative.

.

The next week, howeve~t on May 7, 1911, peace

negotiations were declared at an end and without results.

It

may have been sheer coincidence that 'lhe two events occurred
at the same time, but apparently the state Department did not
think so.
In view of these circumstances, Knox required an
explanation from Standard Oil Company.25

Archbold, Vice

President of Standard Oil, replied:
All statements of this character emanating from whatever
source are absolutely without
foundation and I desire on behalf
of the company to r~eister an emphatic disavowal •••
Standard Oil also sent a man to Washington to clear up any
particulars, but the investigation was never carried further
and Madero was given continued encouragement from Washington.
By October, 1911, Diaz was sufficiently out of the

.
24
25
26

Attorney General to Secretary of state, April 28, 1911",
State Dept. Arch. (File No. 812.00/1542).
Knox to J. D. Archbold, May 10, 1911, state Dept. ~.
(File No. 812.00/1593).
Archbold to Knox, May 15, 1911, state Dept. £U:.2h. ,
(File No. 812.00/1796).

~'~--------------------------------------I
14

picture so that the promised elections finally took place and
Madero was elected on a genuinely popular vote.

-One of the

noteworthy aspects ot this election was the spectacular rise

ot the Catholic Party in winning a

.

fa~ge

number ot seats in

Congress, but Madero's henchmen saw that "in the most shameful dirty, illegal and despotic

manne~,

the majority of their

votes were discredited and thrown out".27

This tailure to

respect suftrage rights was the beginning ot the chain ot
Madero t s broken promises that was to drag him trom power; yet
the overwhelmingly popular support of the newly elected

pre~i

dent at the polls seemed to augur well tor at least a few
years ot peace, and President Taft's immediate recognition ot
the new government was advised by many influential men.

Tatt,

though, foresaw only chaos in Diazts removal, as may be seen
in a letter written to his wife a year previous:
It is inevitable, that in
case of a revolution or interne.c ine strife, we should interfere
and I sincerely hope that the old
man's (Diaz) otticial life will
extend the limits of mine, tor
that trouble would present a problem of the utmost difticulty.28
27

28

Jose Lopez-Portilla y Rojas, Elavacio~ I Caida £! f2£tirio Diaz, Mexico, 1921, 481.
.
Tatt to his wite, June, 1910, ~ Papet!, President's
Letter Book, Vol. 20, No. 235, Library ot Congress.

15

Taft·s prophecy was being

~ulfilled,

for it looked like the

United states would have to interfere, after Ambassador Henry
L. Wilson's alarming reports
of foreigners t property.

o~

insurrection and destruction

Troops were

der the guise of umaneuvers".

~ent

to the border un-

Later, though, President Taft,

,.

in a confidential chat with Hart Lyman, the Managing Editor
of the New

~

Tribune, Edward P. Mitchell, the President of

the New York Sun, and Charles Hopkins Clark, the editor of
the

Couraq~

of Hartford, Connecticut, revealed the reason for

the government·s misrepresentation of troop movements:
I was in a situation where I
eould not take the public into my
confidence, because to do so would
be almost a casus belli with the
existing government of Mexico,
which had minimized the insurrection in every way and had contemptuously denied all danger from it.
So I allowed the War Department to
report that the going of troops
was for maneuvers ••• 29
Taft's military m'easures, however, were not the move
I

of an alarmist.

On the basis of the numerous and detailed re-

ports submitted to the State Department for the President's
consideration, it was clearly apparent that the Madero revolution was a popular uprising.
29

It was also evident that the

Taft to various Editors, March, 1911, ~l! Papers, President's Letter Book, Vol. 24, No. 418, Library of Congress.

16

strong anti-American sentiment was a threat to American investments which amounted to over a billion dollars.

Previ-

ouS to Taft's decision, he had requested that a circular
,

.

,10 "'?

letter be sent to the consul resident in Mexico asking the
••• fullest statement of' conditions there in regard to the insurrection and its eff~ct on
American residents and American
interests ••• lt is essential that
I should follow as closely as
possible the conditions in Mexico with respect to taking proper
steps to protect American lives
and interests. 30
The circular letter was sent and the replies came in almost
immediately.

Salina Cruz reported:

"Strong anti-American,

anti-Diaz tendencies, with widespread pro-revolutionary
feeling tt • 31 Ninety-five percent of the district of Durango
was stated to be Anti-American; seventy-five percent were
pro-revolutionary_

The revolution appeared to be gaining in

strength, and the people were in sympathy with the movement.
33
Anti-American feeling was general in Chihualua.
The ma30

Taft t~Knox, March 20, 1911, State Dept. Arch., 812.00
Mexican Despatches, IV, (File No. 812.00/1045).
r
31 Haskell to Carr, March 19, 1911, State Dept. Arch.,
812.00 Mexican Despatches, IV, (File No. 812.00/991).
32 Freeman to Knox, March 19, 1911, State ~.l2..£. Arch.,
812.00 Mexican Despatches, IV, (File No. 812.00/992).
33 Leonard, Vice-Consul to Knox, March 19, 1911, State
Dept. Arch., 812.00 Mexican Despatches, IV, (File No.
812.00/993).

32

17
jority of the people of Monterey were believed to be revo1utionary.34

"My district is all anti-American", reported

Donald Smith, Consul at Aguas Calientes, "and is ninetythree percent pro-revolutionary"'. 3S.• 'ind so it went.

Revo-

lutionary feeling was strong in San Luis potosi,3S Vera
Cruz,37 and GUadalajara. 38 Consul Millar stated that in

'.

Mazatlan there was ttpractica1ly unanimous revolutionary
feeling tt • 39 From Acupulco, the report came: "Revolution
will succeed when its organization is perfected.

Owing to

abuses by the authorities populace would certainly welcome
change in Government."40

Finally, it was reported from

Mexico City that the "Student, middle and lower classes"
were "strongly anti-American and pro-revolutionarylt.
was especially noticeable in the cities. 4l
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
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From his experience in the Philippines Taft knew
what a thankless task and expenditure it was to intervene.

,. .,

And the recognition of a Government
. .unable to keep its elec...

~

tion promises in any form is a certain way of forcing the
hand of intervention.

Mere good intentions never carried an

administration through, and Madero
to the rule.

w~

to prove no exception

This Mexican President pleased no one; the

peons cried for land reform; teachers were lacking to institute the promised educational reform; the foreign investers
lost some of their concessions; Diaz's favorites were overlooked; but above all
••• the success of the revolution
had aroused all the military ambitions put under an anaesthetic by
the vigor of Diaz. Now, however'42
all wanted a share of the spoils.
Revolutionary l.eaders were to be found in every
large district.

When Madero appealed to the President of

the United States to force American munition makers to cease
shipping arms to the insurrectionists, Taft prevailed on
Congress, &s a means of restoring peace, to pass a joint reso-

.

'

lution granting the president control of "such materials from
the United States to any American country where conditions of
domestic violence might eXist".43
42
43

Calcott, 201.
Bemis, 171.

Even such a measure failed

~~------------------------------~
to quell the rebellions in north or south Mexico. 44

.'

After a coup d'etat failed in early February, 1913,
under the leadership of General Reyes, Felix Diaz, nephew of
the former dictator, took over the c~~and of the insurrectionists.

As these forces gained in numbers and popularity,

Madero made an effort to strengthen hi: army.

Against his

better judgment the President placed General Victoriano Huerta
in charge of the palace guard and made him responsible tor the
security of the capital. 45

Huerta, tundamentally a man of

porfirian antecedents and sympathies, soon joined forces with
Felix Diaz.

Huerta, this new figure of Aztec parentage, be-

lieved in ruthless suppression of all opposition. 46
The revolutionists informed Henry Lane Wilson, the
United States Ambassador to Mexico, ot the forthcoming events.
Wilson in turn immediately wired the State Department:
Huerta notifies
me to expect some action that will remove
Madero trom power at any moment;
plans fully matured, the purpose
of delay being to avoid any violence or bloodshed ••• I am unable
to say whether or uot these plans
will materialize. 4,,/
Priestley, 407.
Priestley, 411.
46 Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame Qf Mexico, McBride
Nast & Co., 1914, 211.
47 Papers Relating to ~ For8ign Relation ~ 1h! United
States, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1913, 718.
44

45
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On February 18th, Huerta and Diaz seized the government.
world feared more bloodshed.

The

"Apprehensive of what might en-

sue after the downfall of President Madero, I invited General
,

Huerta and

General Diaz to come

.

t~the

Embassy to consider

the preservation of order in the city M,48 was the Ambassa-

.
But before Wilson received an assur-

dorts assurance to WaBhington that the welfare of foreigners
would be safeguarded.

ance of order, he had to threaten American intervention if
.
d'1a t e1y. 49
'
an d Huer t a d'd
1 no t come t 0 t erms 1mme
D1az

Th os'e

terms were that "Huerta should be the Provisional President
of the Republic and that Diaz should name the Cabinet, and
thereafter he should have the support of Huerta tor the
permanent presidencyK.50
Meanwhile the imprisoning of the ex-President and
Vice President in the National Palace caused Secretary of
State Knox to warn Wilson that:
••• ~General Huerta's consulting
you as to the treatment of Madero tends to give you a certain
responsibility in the matter.
It moreover goes without saying
that cruel treatment ot the exP~esident would injure, in the
48
49
50

Ibid., 720, 721.
Henry L,. Wilson, Diplomatic E-gisodes 1:!l ~~, Belgium,
~ Chile, Doubleday, Page & Co_, ~ew York, 280.
Foreign Relations, 1913, 721.
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eyes of the world, the reputation of Mexican civi1ization ••• n5l
Huerta, therefore, "swore on a scapulary of the Virgin of

....

Guadalupe and a medal of the Sacred ijeart ••• that he would per,
mit no one to attempt the life of Senor Madero u • 52
A few days later, on February 23, 1913, Madero and
suarez met their death trying to

esca~

transferring them to the penitentiary.
called it murder. 53

from an armed guard
The American Press

Nevertheless, the Ambassador counseled

Washington Uto consider the deaths a closed incident" and
"urged the recognition of the new government-. 54 The Taft
administration, however, had refused to move precipitately
in the matter of recognition, and soon drew rein upon the indiscreet Ambassador:
••• you will ••• be carefully guided
by the Presidentts direction that
for the present, no formal recognition is to be accorded those de
facto in control, except upon specific instructions from the department to do so.bb
Although Washington had been shocked by the deaths of Madero
and Suarez; the real reason for the withholding of recogni~

tion seems to be that Taft, in departing from office, did not
51
52
53

54
55

Ibid-, 725.
Prida, Ramon, De ~ dictadura ~ l! anarguial
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want to saddle his foreign policy, which might prove embarrassing, on the incoming president. 56
At this moment there appeared
. on the scene a man
,

~~

destined to have a drastic effect on the future of Mexico.
A scholar and self-centered idealist, Thomas Woodrow Wilson,
succeeded Taft as President of the

Un~ted

States.

He was

born, the son of a minister, at Staunton, Virginia in 1856.
During those first trying years after graduation when the
young lawyer has so much time on his hands waiting for elients, Wilson devoted himself to the study of history and political science.

This interest

was greatly responsible for

his abandonment of the courtroom for the classroom at Bryn
Mawr.

After going to Princeton he soon became its President.

His next promotion was the governorship of New Jersey, where
he gained nationwide repute for his political reforms.

His

idealistic actions in this post paved the way for his Presidential climb in 1913. 57
The President-elect was not prepared for the task
ahead as h& himself admitted, stating, "that it would be the
irony of fate

if his administration had to deal chiefly

with foreign ~ffairs when his own preparations had been ex56

57

Ray stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life ~. Letters,
Vol. IV, Doubleday, Doran & Co., New York, 1931, 238.
Baker, III, 174.

~
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elusively in domestic problems".

58

Yet he

re~used

the advice

of authorities on important matters, selected a cabinet of
inexperienced politicians, and flung

.himsel~

into the very

depths ot toreign entanglements trotit the very beginning, as
59
is evident in Mexico.
By a statement to thepress'2t his foreign policy
on March 12, 1913, the world soon became aware of the attitude of the new President ot the United states.

While there

was no direct reference to Mexico, his attitude toward Huerta
could not be doubted:
Cooperation is possible only
when supported at every turn by
the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon
arbitrary or irregular force ••• We
can have no sympathy with those
who seek to seize the power of
government to advance 6eeir own
interests or ambition •.
Ambassador Wilson wired Secretary ot State Bryan on the following day hoping to prevent the President trom issuing any
statement directly against the existing govern-

un~ortunate

ment which might incite rebellion, and he concluded that
~

••• unless the same type of government as was implanted here by
General Porfirio Diaz is again
established, new revolutionary
58
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60
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movements will break forth and
general unrest will be renewed.
With BO% of the population unable to read or write permanent
democratic government cannot be
established in Mexic~~l
While our Mexican representative was clamoring for immediate

'.

recognition, the British Government let it be known that
Huerta would soon be formally recognized as "interim Presid en t "

•~

Its action prompted many other governments,

anxiously waiting such a move by a major power, to acknowledge the present £& fact2 government. 63
If a government, even the smallest, is to continue
to exist, recognition by foreign powers is absolutely essential, for "recognition is the assurance given to a new State
that it will be permitted to h'old its place and rank in the
character of an independent political organism in the society
of nations".64

Before the nineteenth century European na-

tions recognized governments only on a

~

Jyre basis, or in

other words, only those governments which were established on
the basis of legal succession.
United States of America,

~

With the recognition of the

facto governments were coming.,

Foreign Relations, 1913, 776.
B. J. Henrick, Life ~1etters 2t Walter Hines Page,
Vol. I, Doubleday, Page & Co., New York, 1925, 19B.
63 Calcott, 23B.
64 John Bassett Moore, Digest of lnternational ~, Gov·t.
Printing Office, Wash., n.c., 1906, I, 72.
61
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into their own; yet in the first quarter of the nineteenth
century the European powers were loath to recognize a de
facto government.

Under the influence of Metternich, the
,

.

Central European nations put down i~Aurrections in Spain,
Naples and Piedmont, but when the central powers attempted
to interfere with the establishment Qf
,.. the new republics in
South America, they brought forth the Monroe Doctrine so ably
65
supported by England's Foreign Minister, canning.
That,
nevertheless, by the middle of the nine,teenth century de
fac!~

governments were accepted, is evidenced in the ready

recognition of the Southern States in the Civil War.
President Pierce set forth the general policy of
our government on May 15, 1856, when in discussing the question of recognizing a new government in Nicaragua, he said:
It is the established policy
of the United States to recognize
all governments without question
of their source, or organization
or of the means by which the governing persons attain their power,
provided there be a government s!
facto accepted ~y the people of
the country ••• 6

"
When Porfirio Diaz came into power by revolutionary means·'in
1876, President Hayes added a new element of delay to our
65
66
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policy, delcaring that although the United States was:
••• accustomed to accept and recognize the results of a popular
choice in Mexico, and not to
scrutinize closely tbe. regularity or irregularityof'the methods by which those results were
brought about, ••• the United
States would wait before recognizing General Diaz ••• ,q,ntil it
is assured that his el~tion is
approved by the Mexican people,
and that his administration is
possessed of stability to endure
and of disposition to comply
with the rules of international
comity and obligation of treaties.6~

It will thus be seen in the Wilson-Huerta controversy that it was not the mere fact of delayed recognition,
but the meddling in Mexico's internal affairs, that was unprecedented.

Naturally without recognition, revolution was

encouraged by our government -- at least implicitly.

But,

due to the pressure of international powers concerned about
their investments in Mexico, Wilson realized that he must
indicate the policy of the United States in an official
statement.

4

It was at this critical moment that President

Woodrow Wilson decided to intervene in Mexican affairs.
67

~My

Relations, 1877, 404. F. W. Seward, acting Secretary of State, to J. W. Foster, May 16, 1877. Foster
was our Minister to Mexico. In his J;li£:l;omatic. Memoirs,
I, 92, he states that Hayes' failure to recognize Diaz
was an attempt to draw the public mind away from his
questionable victory over Tilden by creating a Mexican
issue.
~oreign

~-----------------------------------------,
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passion", he declared, "is for the submerged eighty-five
percent of the people of that Republic who are struggling
now toward liberty tt. 68 From this statement, the Mexican

.

Herald sarcastically remarked that~tlson thought "he knew
the aspirations of the Mexican people better than the Mexicans themselves had ever known them~l69

His ~onfidence

in Ambassador Wilson was gone, and contradictory reports of
the situation determined him to send a personal representati"e to make a report of conditions. 70 William Bayard Hale,
an unfrocked clergyman and newspaper writer, was selected.
The President, ,iii th the inexperience of the neophyte, thus
began his policy of selecting
7l
tempermentally unsuited
but

representati~es

not only

ignorant of the task as-

signed.
Henry L. Wilson naturally resented Hale's presence in Mexico and he protested against the interference.
His irritation was increased when his plan for recognition
in return for a settlement of United States' grievances

against Mexico
received no reply.
.
68
69
70
71

The long awaited reply

Baker, IV, 236.
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was a "confidential note" to the Ambassador stating that
recognition would depend on a fair election in which Huerta
72
would under no conditions be a candidate.
While the Ambassador w~i urging military intervention to keep Huerta in power and restore peace, Hale was
recommending armed force to put th: dictator out.

Hale's

reports to Washington, consequently painted Wilson in most
odious colors.

How influential these notes were in Washing-

ton, and how instrumental they were in the recall of the Ambassador, is seen in one of the President's messages to Secretary of State Bryan:
The document from Hale is indeed extraordinary. I should like
••• to discuss with you very seriously the necessity of recalling
H. L. Wilson in one way or another,
perhaps, merely for 'consultation'
until we can have a talk with the
man himself. 73
The opportunity came with the Ambassador's next note:

tlI am

obliged to urge upon the President the pressing necessity of
some action of a drastic and convincing kind".74

The answer

was an lmmediate call to Washington for "consultation"....

The

meeting took place on July 28th, and on August 4th Bryan
72
73
74
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asked for the Ambassador's resignation, since the latter refused to place
dent's. 75

his Mexican policy in line with the Presi,

.

,;p ..,

Numerous accounts of the diplomacy of the Mexican
Revolution have tended to emphasize the machinations of Ambassador H. L. Wilson, and

attribut~to

for the overthrow of Madero.

him responsibility

While no attempt is made to

minimize the rather discreditable role played by the American Ambassador, the State Department papers clearly reveal
that he was merely fulfilling a basic desire of the Taft
administration.

The main responsibility in the course of

events which followed appears to rest squarely upon the Department of State, and Taft, for both gave full support to
Ambassador Wilson, and formulated the basic policy, whieh
he carried out most faithfully and literally.
The Ambassador's friendship and connections with
the oil men and other vested interests in Mexico proved to
be one of the chief" causes

of friction with viashington.

76

In early May a group of financiers had almost convinced the
or
President of the need of immediate recognition,7? but
75
76
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Wilson could not accept unasked for advice. 78

By July} he

was convinced that his opponents were the monied interests
of Great Britain and the United States:

.

.;;. ..'7

I have to pause and remind
myself that I am President of the
United States, and not of a small
group of Americans w~~h vested
interests in Mexico.,
With such a determined view the Ambassador's opposition
could result only in resignation; and with the demand for
resignation, the President could never recognize the government of Huerta.
The increase of chaos in Mexico, and the deepening
of secrecy in the W'hi te House, were gradually turning the
nation against

~I}'oodrow

,!filson.

He refused to take Congress

into his confidence, because he believed the

ft

more quietly

we go a tout it, the more likely success will be". 80
something constructive had to be accomplished.
was the

Yet

The result

choice of another personal representa.tive to inform

Huerta of the President's policy in a clear cut, concise and
unmistakab~e

manner.

The whole aim of the mission was to

establish free elections without Huerta running for office.
78
79

80
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Bryants personal friend, the former Governor of Minnesota,
John Lind, was selected as the new mediator. 8l Lind was
commissioned to instruct Huerta to

...,

p~esent

his resignation.

,

Complete unfamiliarity with Latin American affairs, untried
in diplomatic circles, not to mention his inability to speak
a word of Spanish, made him the most ~fit person who could
have been sent. 82 With such a background, Lind's appearance
in Mexico naturally caused some ttbarking of shins tt • 83
Despite the insult to his government, Huerta received the new unofficial representative.

on August 16th,

two days later, Gamboa, Huerta's Foreign Minister, replied
in courteous terms to Lind's message.

Gamboa mentioned that

the United States must consider Huerta as Q& facto President,
since he was requested to arrange for an election.

In ad-

dition, all the other charges were well answered, and the

-

question of Huertats candidacy "was to be decided only by
Mexican public opinion expressed at the polls".84
Again, on August 25th, Lind requested Huerta to
withdraw
81
82
83
84

h~s

hat from the ring in the coming elections, offer-

Bemis, 176.
Thompson, 261.
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ing as bait the guarantee of the Presidentts assistance in
procuring a loan from American bankers, but the dictator
could not be bribed:
••• the Government 01 the United
states insinuates that it will
recommend to American bankers the
i~~ediate extension of a loan •••
to the end, that, move~ by petty
interests we should re~ounce a
right which incontrovertibly upholds us. When the dignity of a
nation is at stake, I believe
that there are not loans enoug~5
to •••permit it to be lessened.
The failure of Lind's mission did not help in
lessening the growing opposition to Wilson.

Since the Presi-

dent's tariff bill in the Senate, and his currency bill in
the House needed every possible bit of support, Wilson took
Congress into his confidence on August 27th, by revealing
the Lind instructions in an effort to gain adherents. 86 His
"watchful waiting" policy was clearly stated:
There was no call for drastic action ••• clearly everything
that we do must be rooted in patience ••• The steady pressure of
moral force will before many days
break the barriers of pride and
prejudice down, and we shall triumph as Mexico's friends soon
than we could as her enemies. 87
85
86
87

ru,g.,
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This talk to Congress surprisingly had a wonderful effect in
restoring public confidence in the administration.

In fact,

.. ."

Bryan was jubilantly confident that ttthings were going along
,

.....

quite well at present, and we only have to sit tight and
await the election".88
South of the border, howev,r, matters were not
quite so happylating

Lind

warned Bryan that Huerta was manipu-

political strings which would force his puppets to

· ~n
.
keep h ~

on October

89
0 foP'
k~ce.
18th~by

The dictator justified Lind's fears

dissolving the Chamber of Deputies with

the aid of armed force, and by arresting one hundred and
ten of the Congressman.

"He didn't arrest members of the

,Catholic Party, who, for the most part, had been trying to
sustain order through him; they are, after all is said and
done, the conservative, peace-wishing element in Mexico. u90
This fact only added fuel to the ever growing fire of accusations that many of the clergy were assisting Huerta with
both arms and

money.91

" Immediately Woodrow Wilson wired the American
88
89
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charge d'affairs, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, to notify the provisional government of Washington's reaction:
The President, shocked at the
lawless methods em~~yed by General Huerta is deeply distressed •••
The President believes that an
election held at this time ••• and
under the present conditions as
they now exist would.have none of
the sanction with wh~ch the law
surrounds the ballots ••• The President would not feel justified in
recognizing a President so chosen. 92
Huerta replied by action:

A typical Mexican election under

his supervision, which provided for his reelection.
had been defied.

Wilson

Within four days Bryan notified the diplo-

matic officers of leading foreign powers:
that it is his (President) immediate duty to req~ire Huerta's retirement from the Mexican Government, and that the United States
must now proceed to employ such
means as be necessary to secure
this result; and ••• we will not regard as binding upon the people of
Mexico anything done by Huerta •••
The President hopes that the Government to which you are accredited will see fit to use its influence to impress upon Huerta the
wisdom of retiring ••• 93
If Great Sritain could be brought over to support
92
93
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Wilson's policy, the acquiescence of the rest of Europe was
assured.

Mexico, probably, could forthwith be reduced in

reality to the statute of a protectorate of the United States.
,

.

But "the British felt they had a cau\e; for complaint with the
American Government, on the matter of the canal tolls; the
American Government, on the other han q , felt that the British
were hampering Wilson's policy in Mexico". 94
for bargaining existed.

Clearly a basis

These considerations no doubt led

the British to send Sir William Tyrell, secretary to Sir Edward Grey, to Washington, ostensibly to visit the British ambassador, in reality to discuss Mexico and Panama Canal
tolls. 95

On the following day, November 14, the British min-

ister in Mexico, Sir Lionel Carden, in union with other diplomats advised Huerta to yield to the President's demands.

Yet

~

Englishmen were still a trifle baffled at Washington's support of Carranza and Villa, "hose chara.cters to all appearances were just as tarnished as Huerta's.

Wilson, whereupon,

declared that "Carranza was the best of the three, and Villa
was not so ~ad as he had been painted".96

.

'

After Europe's apparent turn about, Wilson became
94
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more confident in his "watchful waiting" policy, but the dictator knew the European powers were not opposed to him, and
did not want him to accept their forced advice. 97 Huerta's
.;;.

....,

continued negotiations with powers across the sea made Lind
even more insistent on his plea for armed intervention or at
least some support for the

Constitutio~l

forces, but Bryan

strongly urged the President to continue his non-interventionist policy.

As a compromise, ?iilson gave his blessing to Civil

War by lifting the arms embargo on February 3, 1914, for the
benefit of the Constitutionalist forces.

In fact, this meant

that Villa and Carranza would now receive munitions openly
from the United states. 98 In the violence that ensued, a
British subject was killed and the United States was finding
it more difficult to refrain from action.
The situation daily grew more tense, with the result
~hat

a slight indiscretion of a Mexican soldier developed into

an international crisis.

On April 9, 1914, at the port of

Tampico a subordinate offic,er arrested seven American sailors
stepping ashore from a tender to buy supplies for the U.S.S.
Dolphin.

the American flag.
97
98
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Two men were also ordered out of the tender flying
The whole group was marched through the
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town when they met a superior of£icer, who had them quickly
released with an expression of regret, in which Huerta later
joined.

Admiral Mayo then demanded of General Zaragoza that
.

.

,1- ..;

he publicly hoist the American flag in a prominent position
on shore and salute it with twenty-one guns, which salute
was to be duly answered by this ShiP.9.9
dorsement to this preposterous demand.

Wilson gave his enHuerta's offer to

arbitrate, in accordance with the provision of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, consequently was declined by the United
states as tta subject in no circumstances fit for discussion
by such a tribunal as that of the Hague tt • lOO
At this crucial moment, April 20, 1914, President
'l1ilson "entirely at his ease ttl01 appeared before Congress to
ask approval for armed forces:

.
99

100
101
102

The incident cannot be regarded as a trivial one ••• I,
therefore, ask your approval that
I should use the armed forces of
the United States in such ways
and to such an extent as may be
necessary to obtain from General
Huerta and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights ~nd
dignity of the United States. 1 2
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The President outlined in detail the events which led up to
the disturbances at Tampico.

In so doing, he magnified the

occurrences, and deliberately lied in order to strengthen
,

his case against Huerta.

.

In descritrhg the Tampico affair

Wilson stated that a few days after the incident had occurred, an orderly from the U.S.S.

Mi~nesota

was arrested

at Vera Cruz while ashore in uniform to obtain the ship's
mail, and was for a time thrown in jail.

Wilson was aware,

or should have been, of Admiral Fletcher's report, submitted
April 16th, which indicated that the mail orderly had been
immediately released by the Mexican judge, and therefore had
never been in jail.

The sailor was only taken to the jail

because he could not speak Spanish to state his business to
the officer in the street.

"The attitude of the Mexican au-

thorities", stated Fletcher, "was correct; there is no cause
for complaint against them and the incident is without significance" •

103

Congress was not at all enthusiastic in their re103

•

Admiral Fletcher to Daniels, April 16, 1914, Foreign.,
Relations, 1914, p. 465. If Wilson ordered the troops
into Mexico without reading Fletcher's message, his
negligence is inexcusable; if he did read them, as he
must have done, he deliberately lied in his message to
Congress.
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ception of the President's message.

Although the resolution

received an overwhelming vote, the preceding debate caused
104
Wilson much concern as to the ultimate outcome.
After
the removal of the decorative fri1i.·~he real motive for the
bombardment and occupation of Vera Cruz was evident.

It was

not any insult to the flag, but the message from Consul Can-

,..

ada of Mexico advising that a cargo of machine guns and ammunition, consigned to the Mexican Government, would be unloaded at that port on April 21st:
The thing that determined action
••• was the feeling that if the
ammunition was landed it would
strengthen the usurping president and increase the loss of
life in Mexico and that later
the guns might bio~urned upon
American youths.
All contending factions in.Mexico, including Carranza, resented this intervention.

In fact, when the bodies of the

nineteen bluejackets, sacrificed in this action, reached the
United States, one wonders how Wilson could have been serious in stating before Congress:

tIThe people of Mexico are

entitled to settle their own domestic affairs in their own
way ••• tt .106
104
105
106

~ ~ Times, April 21, 1914.
Josephus Daniels, 1M Life 2.! VioC!)drow Wilson, 183.
F.~reign Relations, 1914, Wilson to Congress, 476.
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Were it not for the Deus

machina mediation of-

fer by the three leading South American powers, Argentina,
Brazil and Chile, Wilson would have found his policy termin,

.

ating in the dead end alley of war.· ~agerly Wilson and Bryan, in conjunction with the members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, accepted this La\in American offer.
The reaction at home and abroad, especially in South America,
was unmistakably favorable.

!h! Springfield Republican could

not have been more enthusiastic:
The incident is worth hundreds of tours of South American
capitals by our Secretaries of
state, with innumerable speeches
on Pan-American solidarity. It
is worth dozens of Pan~American
conferences. For an act like
this crystallizes fine words and
elOquent periods into a landmark
of Pan-American diplomacy. It
establishes a prece~o~t; possibly
it opens a new era.
As the Conference at Niagara Falls with the ABC
powers progressed, Wilson became more determined to dominate
it:
"

107

~

The object of our conferences now is to find a method
by which the inevitable can be
accomplished without further
bloodshed. By the inevitable
we mean not only the elimination of Huerta, but the comple-

Springfield Republican, April 28, 1914.

....

4l.
tion of the revol.ution by the
transfer of political power
from Huerta to those who represent the interests and aspirations of the people ••• 108
,

;;.

...,

Negatively the President was also an obstacle to the mediators by his refusal to use his influence in having Carranza
cease hostilities during the Conferen,e.
Huerta was most cooperative.

On the other hand,

He offered to resign, provid-

ing his successor would be a neutral, and the ABC powers, at
President Wilson's request, agreed to,mediate, but an unexpected obstacle to this solution presented itself when Carranza refused to submit his pretensions to arbitration.
t'He would not accept the intervention or even the initiation
of any foreign government in the internal affairs of the Republic. nl09 • Bryan stepped in and by doubtful diplomacy
,..
saved the situation by backing Carranza.

And when reminded

that he had pledged himself to support the Mexican delegation in naming a neutral candidate, he replied:
When you can't keep a promise, you can't keep it, and that
is all there is to it. I dontt
want to hear any more about it. llO
108

Foreign Relations, 1914, Bryan to the Special Commissioners, 506.
109 ~xcelsior, Dec. 2, 1925.
110 Ibid., Sept. 2, 1925, Editorial of Salado Alvarez.
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When it was suggested that a civilian be chosen to fill the
provisional presidency, Bryan became still more emphatic:
"Not

Carranza must be provisional president, and permanent

president" .111

Without a doubt the·~'tcretary of State' 8

stand was due to Lind's insistent demands that the temporary

.

president be nan avowed Constitutionalist".112

Yet it i8

difficult to reconcile this method of filling an elective
office with Wilson's passion to make the world "safe for
democracy"'.
This unqualified support of the Constitutionalist
leader was something of a mystery to the powers abroad, who
criticized constantly the savage banditry of the Mexican
leaders.

Wilson, consequently, was at pains to rectify their

notions:
The thing which seems to me moat
important now with respect to the
Mexican business is that over
there (Europe) the people should
get a more Just and correct view
of Villa. Carranza I believe to
be honest ••• a person who can be
counted on to try and do the
right thingsl l13

"
In time he would be forced to admit the rectitude of the
European views.
III

112
113

Ibid., Nov. 16, 1925, Editorial of Salado Alvarez.
lQreign Relations, 1914, 523, also, 505, 512.
Baker, IV, 347, Wilson to Page.

,
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The agreement which after interminable discussions
was finally reached on June 24th was far indeed from carrying out Wilsont s program, but it indirectly fulfilled many
,

of his desires.

.

War was avoided; Hffe*ta resigned on July

15th; and the way was prepared for Carranza to step into
power on August

2~st;

but more than a

1r

else, the ABC Medi-

ation powers, with the cooperation of the United States,
helped to bring appreciably nearer a concert and harmony of
the western world.I~4
The world acclaimed Wilson for his diplomatic triumph and applauded his policy as a definite victory for humanity, but the President was not deceived.
to October,

~915,

From July 1914,

Carranza, Villa and Zapata took turns in

overrunning Mexico City.

A vociferous minority in the

United~

states gradually increased their cry for intervention to protect the life and property of Americans.

Wilson foresaw that

if the Mexican problem were not settled before the war in
Europe ended, there would be solid grounds for foreign intervention. 115• As a last resort the President called again upon
r

South America to advise on what regime to support as a provisional government pending honest election.
114
115

Baker, IV, 350.
Bemis, 180.

"Mexico is ap-
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parently no nearer a

solution~,

Wilson tragically admitted,
"than she was when the revolution was first enkindled. tt11.6
The Ambassadors of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and
the Ministers from Bolivia,

.
Uruguay ida

Guatamala met with

Secretary of state Lansing on October 9th, 1915, earnestly
hoping to prevent the intervention Wilson was contemplating.ll?

•

Within two days the delegates decided that the

Carr~cista

party was the only party possessing the essentials for recognition as the de facto government, and they so reported to
their respective governments.

On October 19, 1915, the

united States government recognized Venustiano Carranza as
the Chief Executive of Mexico,118 in the hope that international support of his government would enable him to restore peace.

Simultaneously President Wilson proclaimed an

embargo on arms to Mexico, except for shipments made to the
newly organized government. 119
Villats reaction to such recognition was an indignation overshadowed only by his defiance against our country.
He sought revenge
by taking American lives on American soil,
..
with the ulterior motive of causing armed intervention by the
116
117
118
119

Foreign Relation§, 1915, 694.
~bid., 695.
Foreign Relations, 1915, Lansing to Parker, 771.
~., 760-82.
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united States.

His dream was to have all Mexico rally under

his standard to beat off the Colossus of the North.

When

this outlaw murdered sixteen young American engineers working
for Carranza, Congress was for

.

arme~ ~ntervention,

" ~'thl
accep t e d th e Fi rs t Ch ~e~
s wor
ess

but Wilson

"~"
o~ JUs t·
1ce. 120

prom~se

'.

villa's raids into New Mexico were the straw that broke the
camel's back.

When Wilson called out the militia to pursue

Villa into Mexican territory, intervention became reality.
Carranza bitterly condemned the American invasion on Mexican
soil and he warned that Hthe move could easily lead to war tt • 121
In June) war was almost declared when several clashes occurred
between some men of Per.shing's command and Mexicans at Parral,
and a collision with a force of Carranza's troops at Carriza1.
The United States President still determined to
keep peace, adopted Lansing's suggestion of a joint MexicanAmerican

co~nission

to reach an understanding.

-

The net re-

sult of the New London Conference was a victory for Mexican
diplomacy:

The withdrawal of American troops from Mexican

territory; the restoration of full diplomatic relations between the two countries; and the decision to rigorously patrol
the borders against further raids.

----,--120
121
122

Bemis, 181.
Foreign ~tions, 1916, 486.
Stephenson, 313.
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When immediate

di~~iculties

were smoothed over,

Wilson concentrated his attention upon the national campaign
~or

the

pre~idency.

Germany came.

A~ter

his

..

re-e~ection,

the break with

,;,

Step by step, the United States was gradually

sucked into the European maelstrom.

Wilson was eager to

have an understanding wi th Carranza .... When the Mexican Congress assembled as an electoral college and made Carranza
president, and a new constitution was drawn up, Wilson quickly granted de jure recognition to Carranza by exchanging ambassadors on March 3, 1.917.

With the

~ormal

elevation of

Carranza to the presidency and the adoption of a constitution
which embodied many of the

re~orms

of the revolution, Wilson

rested content that his principal objectives in Mexico had
123
been gained.
On April 4, the United States Congress declared war against Germany.

For the next two years, the

Mexican question remained in the background.
When the United States entered into the European
con~lict,

it was more or less expected that Mexico wou1.d side

with the allies and the United States, since Carranza's administration,

a~ter

all, owed its existence to President Wil-

son and the United States.
from itl
123

This was not to be the case.

Far

Carranza came out almost immediately in favor of a

Bemis, 1.82-1.83.
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"most strict neutrality".

The folly of President Wilson's

policy soon revealed itself.

The Mexican Ambassador at

Washington, Bonilla, declared:
~.

Our chief aim is to remain
neutral. To us this is not only
a just but necessary policy.
Mexico's position is not like
that of other countries, •• If the
question of national honor or
Mexico's sovereign rights were
involved, a deliberate policy of
self-sacrifice might be necessary. But the belligerent countries have not given us cause for
resentment, and our interests
have not been injured, nor have
they been seriously threatened.
We cannot afford to participate
in the war on one side or the
other if we can possibly avoid
it. Our policy is, therefore,
one of peace and reconstruction
as against war and ravage. 124
Mexico, however, did not maintain a strict neutrality, but, in fact, lent a willing ear to German intrigue.
Carranza, moreover, sought to undermine the influence of Wilson in Latin America, and issued decrees which brought down
upon him the implacable enmity of American vested interests.
For instance, at a time when the uninterrupted flow of oiL,
from the fields of Tampico was essential, Carranza took steps
to interfere in the oil industry by issuing edicts in pursuance of Article XXVII of the Constitution of 1917 which gave

r
48

direct dominion over subsoil product. to the nation. 125

This

was to mark the great oil controversy between Mexico and
American-British interests.

The publication of the Zimmerman
,

.

,1- .-.

note also cast grave suspicions on Mexico's sympathies.
Such a policy was the expression of gratitude to
the man 'and the nation that placed Cqrranza in power.

Yet a

statement of Theodore Roosevelt, perhaps a bit extreme, more
justly shifts the blame from the First Chief to the White
House Head whose efforts unhappily changed the course of a nation and later a world:
Mexico is our Balkan Peninsula, and during the last five
years, thanks largely to Mr. Wilson's able assistance, it has been
reduced to a condition as hideous
as that of the Balkan Peninsula
under Turkish rule. 126

:iIIi'I

For almost ten years, the financier, colonist and
statesman were absorbed in this Mexican drama directed by
Woodrow Wilson.

Through the study of government documents,

newspapers and the research efforts of historians, we have
been able in this first chapter to obtain a clear enough per-

"

r-

spective to Justify critical Judgments on the dramatis RersQn~!,

125
126

who appeared on the Mexican stage during the critical

Ibid., 523-524.
Record, 65 Cong. 3 Sess., LVII, App. 377. Rep. Norman J.
GroUlClof New York quoted part of T. Roosevelt's last
message to the Ame~ican people.

years of that nation three decades ago.

·'
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Yet the political

and economic problems were not the only issues at stake.
Revolution, and then, religious persecution added to the al-

.

ready existing complications.

The C~~ch could not remain

silent, as long as the sword of injustice caused Mexican
blood to flow.
The secular press, perhaps, was not completely
aware that the majority of Mexicans were more concerned with
policies infringing on religious liberty for themselves,
than on concessions granting tax reductions to American
capitalists.

The religious-minded in the United states, too,

quite naturally, anxiously regarded the moral implications
of the two governments' policies.

Thus, while a Chicago

Tribune was blasting Wilson's wavering measures, or a New
York World applauded the President's apparent strategy, the
religious press was influencing the political views of its
readers by the editors' criticism of the religious consequences of '.1ilson' s Mexican policy.

Since the Protestant

pre ss, howe'ler, b earned wi th approval on our Administration t s
rejection of the Catholic dictator, Huerta, while the Catholic papers vehemently disapproved of Wilson's friendship
clasp with Carranza and Villa, the tools of anti-clericals,
the policies of the religious press aimed at influencing po-

50

litical action are deserving of a special study.

"
"',

CHAPTER II
THE PROTESTANT PRESS ON WILSON'S POLICY
,

.. ..-,

By 1910, the Protestant missionary was no stranger
in Mexico.

His first beachhead had been established, when

he entered that land with Bible and.tract in hand in the
wake of the American armies in 1846.

Progress was slow.

Then, Diaz in the 1880's opened the Mexican gates to colonists, merchants and tycoons from the North.

Soon, Sunday

schools, churches, publishing houses and institutions of
higher learning were found in the larger cities.

By 1902,

sixteen denominations had established camps to war on the
Roman Catholic Church.

In 1916, due to the favor of the

revolutionary leaders, there were six hundred Protestant

,...

churches and places of regular worship and four hundred Sunday schools with a total enrollment of over forty thousand.
While the number of conversions was insignificant in the
-

light of the years of labor and money spent, yet the fact
remained that the Protestants under Diaz had been tolerated
•

and encouraged by some of the revolutionist leaders.
horizon seemed

bri~ht,

..

The

even rosy, after Huerta's downfall

and Carranza's rise to power.

It was only natural then,

.'
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that the Protestants in the United States after investing so
much in men and money in the Mexican missions should follow
the political maneuvers during the revolutionary days with
..."
,.,.
the keenest interest.
,

The whole world in fact watched with an interested
and critical eye the apparent victory.of absolutism over
democratic institutions when General Diaz was sworn in on
December 5, 1910, for the eighth time as President of Mexico.
Yet all was not well, for the tremor of revolution could be
felt.

The ceremony indicated this as it took place quietly

with none of the pomp and publicity usual on such occasions,
nor were the people allowed to collect in crowds in the
streets.

A general air of uneasiness seemed to pervade the

capital, when the Commissioners were sent to negotiate with
the revolutionary leaders ways and means of bringing the
present disturbance to an end.
Hardly had the echo of the inauguration died away
when the presses of the world were set in motion to blare
forth the event. Diaz once again came to the fore as thou"
sands of editors favorably or unfavorably evaluated his lite,
his works and Mexico's future.
silent.
sized:

Nor was the Protestant press

For as the editor of the Presbyterian

Ba~

empha-

ttProtestantism has had place in Mexico only during

....
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the last twogenerations».l

This statement well explained

the strong backing the paper had given the General in the
July elections:
,

.

Government by th~ ~onstitu
tion was his platform.- Mistakes
were made, but Mexico was governed and prospered ••• No one can
question that his rule has been
far more efficient than~y with
changing Presidents could have
been. He had encouraged democracy too, looking forward to the
day when the nation might be
really self controlling ••• The Administration of Diaz is not democratic. It could not be with the
widespread indifference among the
masses. 2
The Baptists, who were also active in Mexico and knew on
which side their bread was buttered, in the Standard loudly
proclaimed Diaz as tithe great general, the greater president u • 3 The refrain, however, was quite different on the
editorial page of the Southern Methodist Review:

~e

(Diaz)

educated people in helplessness - he is a short sighted and
self blinded egotistH • 4
The growing revolutionary opposition at the time

•

of the inauguration gave strength to the
1
2
3
,4

Methodis~

geviewta

Presbyterian Banner (Pittsburgh), Dec. 15, 1910.
Banner, July 14, 1910.
Standard, (Chicago), Baptist, July 9, 1910.
Southern Methodist ,Quarterly Revi,2, (Nashville), Oct.
1910.

Presbyteri~
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attitude and indicated that, perhaps, Diaz's greatness was
exaggerated.

The Standarg, though, was quick to explain that

the unrest in Mexico was ttnot due to any failure of Diaz to
serve his country well ••• but

.

becaus~~

has served his country long enough~.5

party believes that he
The undenominational

'.

QPristian Herald, always conservative until the direction of
the wind could safely be ascertained, preferred to diagnose
the revolt as "leveled less against Diaz personally than
against the unrepublican and autocratic system he repre6
sents~.
In direct opposition to the 'Southern n~ethodists too,
their northern brethren of the Christ1Sll Advocate could see
no reason for being on the defensive:
The greatness of Porfirio
Diaz is seen in the fact that he
has taken oath as President of
Mexico for the eighth time. Of
course he exercised autocratic
power at various times. Had he
not done so confusion worse con7
founded would have been the result.
This optimistic note was sustained by the Presbyterian

-

~anner

in reporting that during one of the President's public appearances " ••• tne air was also full of acclamation and applause.
It was a genuine, spontaneous ovation".8
5
6
7
8

Emboldened by the

Dec. 3, 1910.
Christian Herald, (New York), Dec. 7, 1910.
Qhristian Advocate, (New York), Methodist, Dec. 15, 1910.
Jan. 5, 1910.

,

.'
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general press support, the Christian Herald became enthusiastic:
President Diaz in his ability and his officialaQministration is one of the moi!'bi" remarkable men in the world ••• order
will be speedily restored in the
revolutionary districts and the
nation will hav continued peace
and p r o s p e r i t y . "

9

In his election platform Diaz had promised several
democratic innovations, and when their fulfillment was delayed, the Independent cooled in its attitude toward the
President.

It thought that if ttDiaz is convinced that justice

requires a distribution of land, he should not wait for the
revolutionists to lay down their arms, but should take measures at once to make the proposed reforms effective".lO Within a month its policy became actually hostile when the editor
remarked that "President Diaz did well for twenty or thirty
years, but it is time that he stepped down from the Presidential chair ... l1
DIAZ RESIGNS
I~

rapid fashion the Ingependent's wish came true,

.

'

and Diaz's resignation was an accepted fact.

The Protestant

9 Jan. 25, 1911.
10 Independent, (New York), Congregationalist, Mar. 24, 1911.
11 April 24, 19l1~

~

.'
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press changed horses rapidly, but the Christian Herald was
not afraid to give the great ruler a final eulogistic farewell:

"His rule has been that of the iron rod, but he had

made Mexico a nation". 12

But when

~:archy,

bloodshed and

destruction continued to rule the day, the press now and
again could not refrain from reminiscing about the peaceful
prosperi ty under the deSl)otic Diaz.

.

"It is not too much to

say", recalled the Standard, "that Mexico moved forward two
centuries in her material welfare during the thirty-six'years
of Diaz's reign" .. 13

tfhile the Q.htistian Q!!ntury remembered

that "under the benevolent dictatorship of Diaz the nation
was held in restraint ••• but order and happiness were maintained among the people" .14
mellow the tone of the

Not even time, however, could

Methodi~~

Review towards Diaz, and

years later, 1916 to be exact, while this paper was trying to
win favor for Carranza, its readers were informed that:

"

••• while Porfirio Diaz came into
power as a liberal by means of a
revolution; he ended his career
as a reactionary and a favorite
of the clericals and the foreign
investors .15

.

'

12
13
14
15

June 10, 1911.
Nov. 15, 1913.
Nov. 6, 1913~
July, 1916.

-

57

Mexico has usually been cursed with bloodshed whenever there is a change of her first executive, and the effort
to supplant Diaz was to prove no exception.

.

With the conse-

quent injury to foreign interests i~ rife and property in
Mexico, President Taft was being forced to take action.

The

sending of troops to the border under .the pretext of maneuvers was his initial move.

The Christia:n lldvocate was among

. the first of the religious press to discuss this vital proh1em.
Its editorial column implicitly told the President to send
the troops into Mexico by holding that "the United States
must protect the property of foreigners or forfeit the use of
the Monroe Doctrine".16

The President too, received a nod of

a;>proval from the Standard "for his wise move in the sending
of troops to the border, where they are ready to intervene if
necessary tt.17

But what was most surprising was the vigorous

support of the Christian Herald at such an early date:

..

16
17
18

The Christian Herald and
its readers do not approve of
war and we chronicle with reluctance anything in the nature of
a warlike demonstration; but the
present instance is one of a
great power using its moral and
material influence for the preservation of order and the pro18
tection of human life and property.

March 16, 1911.
March 18, 1911.
March 22, 1911.

~
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Seldom does a Washington move meet wi th universal
accord, and the Independent's reaction helped to make Taft's
latest step no exception.

While the necessity of sending

troops to the border was fully

acknow~~dged

because Europe

insisted on the protection of her investments, nevertheless,
this paper asked "why did Taft attempt to disguise or conceal

.

his sending of the troops to the border7~19

This was the

first step in the evolution of the Independent's isolationist attitude, which developed greatly within a month.
the

Illi!~m!~

tion~,

Now,

says that "peace depends on Diaz's resigna-

yet strongly warns the President that
••• this is the business of Mexico
not for us. We have no present
right to intervene and can anticipate no occasion which will require it ••• The days of war for
terri~8rial expansion ought to be
past.

-

So desirous was the Independent for peace that Taft's efforts
in early May to bring about a temporary armistice between
Diaz and Madero brought forth an encomium of our President:
ttIt has been fortunate for both countries that the occupant
of the White House is a patient and just man, having a
of humor and well endowed with common sense".2l
19
20

21

March 24, 1911.
April 24, 1911.
May 4, 1911.

sen~

Taft had won
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a new friend, and it was a difficult friendship to win.

And

so complete was this victory, that even when the armistice
collapsed, the Independent was willing to consider the neces-

.

sity of intervention because "we arl ~onfident that Mr. Taft
will deal with the situation calmly and wisely".22
MADERO IN POWER ..

Generally speaking, the policy of the Protestant
Press changed with the reversal of Diaz's fortunes.

The

editorials of the Qh!istianlierald as usual were so tempered
that later they could be interpreted as a defense for the
winning side:
There is not a member of Madero's staff who does not overtop
him in inches, but the silent little fellow is easily the leading
and controlling agent among the
turbulent spirits that surround.
He is "Provisional President" but
should the revolution succeed as
now seems probable, Madero will
step aside promptly for some one
of more statesmanlike cali~re and
larger public experience. 2
As the Madero movement gathered momentum, so did the C4ristian
"
Herald's enthusiasm
"for the great little Mexican, who yet
r

may be hailed as the liberator of the South Republic 'from
petty despotism and narrow ecclesiasticismu • 24

-----,--22
23
24

May 11, 1911.
May 24, 1911.
June 21, 1911.

The Presby-
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~erian ~~nner

lost no time either in jumping on the bandwagon

of the apparently triumphant Madero as it assured its readers
that "Mr. Madero has certainly won not only the confidence

.

but also the affections of those wit~~hom he has come into
contact".25
By August"this turncoat poliiY b'ecame even more
easily explainable when the

Presb~~ian Ban~

highlighted

"Mr. Madero's assurance that he would not reward the Catholic
Party for their support by abrogating the laws of Juarez lt • 26
The Christian Advocate, too, was most jubilant because "Madero
had thus far demonstrated his sanity and strength fl while "the
Catholic attempt to form a national party failed". 27
though the

Indepe~g~nt

Al-

had advocated Diaz's resignation, not

until Madero's success at the polls did it come around to admit reluctantly that "while Madero is not the greatest and
wisest of men, he was the logical candidate of the revolution
and he deserved to be elected tt • 28 Nevertheless, one couldn't
blame its editor for prophesying that "in addition to the difficulties of the situation, the failure to fulfill his extravagant promises would lead to Madero's downfall tt • 29
25
26
27
28
29

June 29, 1911.
Aug. 4, 1911.
Oct. 19, 1911.
Oct. 6, :1.911.
Sept. 7, 191:1..

..'
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This inability of Madero to keep his extravagant
election platform was the blow that aroused the opposition
with consequent loss of life and property.
head of intervention seemed ready

.

t~ ~ise.

Again the ugly
The Christian

agvocate again was early to raise the war whoop:
be bad, but our citizens must be prote,.cted tt • 30

IhNar would
The peace

loving Presbyterian Banner continued to urge all concerned
"to give Madero two or three years to work out his reform'f .31
Madero was even interviewed by the !Adependent on the possibility of peace, but it was not able to share his optimistic view. 32 Such pessimism became justified as 1912 drew to
a close and conditions grew more unsettled, and the cry for
immediate reform more vehement.

The Inde12endent was certain

that Washington would ttadopt a firmer policy".33

The fore-

.'"

cast was literally fulfilled, when Taft in February, 1913,
demanded prompt relief of the chaotic conditions caused by
the revolt under the leadership of Reyes and Felix Diaz.
According to the Preggyterian Banner, this message was an
"u1timatumff • 34 The Independent mournfully read the message

..

30 Jan. 4, 1912.
31 March 13, 1912.
32 Aug. 1, 1912.
33 Dec. 26, 1912.
34 Feb. 20, 1912.

,
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in the same light, yet it hoped for the best because
Mr. Taft's attitude toward Mexico
during the revolution ••• was characterized by patience and good
judgment. Such is h~s..attitude
now, and we are glad"t~ hear that
the members of both parties in
Congress are in agreement with
him •
••• Intervention in Mexico would
mean war ••• We believe that war
would be little short of a calamity ••• Every effort not forbidden by the dignity of a great nation and its regard for citizens
abroad must be ex e rted to avoid
such a conflict. 35
Then it concluded with a wish that later did become a
reality in the ABC Mediation Conferences at Niagara Falls:
••• the cooperation of the unbiased South American Republics
should be sought for any efforts
to mediate or conciliate in Mexico. 36
During these critical days the Baptist

Watq~

was satisfied

with the policy of the Administration, which was holding out
against

..

35
36

3?

••• some of those rasher citizens
who call for intervention in behalf of order ••• but fortunately
the Government at Washington has
not yet sought glory in that direction. 3 ?

Feb. 20, 1912.
Feb. 20, 1912.
Watchman, (Cincinnati), Baptist, Feb. 20, 1912.

.

'
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HUERTA APPEARS
After February 18th, Mexico presented an entirely
new problem:

.. ..

Generals Huerta and Diaz had overthrown Ma-

dero's government.

;.,

Since there seemed to be a peaceful day

dawning on the distant horizon, the Watchman hailed ttthis
coup as one of the most sensible

that has been done
in connection with the present uprising tt • 38 But Huerta imthin~s

mediately lost all chance for favor when he murdered exPresident Madero and his Vice President Suarez.

The Pres-

byterian Banner succinctly summed up the immediate reaction
of many people:

liThe world is shocked at the evident foul

taking off of Madero and Suarez and expects little of
Huerta and his accomplices n • 39 The editorial of the Chri§tian

~dvocate

was merely an echo of that of the

llimn~:

The killing of Gustavo Madero under a fictitious charge,
followed by the murder of Madero and Suarez under similar
pretenses, has shaken the confidence of the world in the
sincerity ~d honesty of General Huerta.
The

"

Inder2~ndent

38
39
40
41

Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.

27,
23,
27,
27,

,

referred to the incident as ttan atrocious ..'

murder f1 ;41 while the Christian Century doubted
1912.
1913.
1913.
1913.

-

tf

if the

64
executors of such a treacherous plot could be moved by sentiments of civilized patriotism or humanitytto42

As usual there

was a less damning attitude in the observation of the Chris-

.

that the deaths occurre& ~

-tian Herald

••• under circumstances that indicate a deliberate assassination
plot. The slim pretext that the
shooting occurred durint; an attempted "rescue" by Madero's partisans has been put forth by the
43
gQvernment but finds few believers.

This story was also quite indigestible for the Independent,
especially when the commander of the "escort" accompanying
the victims "was promoted";44 and it became convinced of its
suspicions when after ttnearly six months have passed, Huerta
still has refused to hold an investigation into Madero's
death".45

Two years later, however, the Sherlock Holmes edi-

tor of the Presbyterian

~anneF

condescended to explain to

-

those still baffled that "in Madero's death you will find in
the background the Roman Catholic Church using the adventurer,
Huerta, a s the cat' s paw for the acc:omplishment of her own
ends".46

"

Madero was dead, yet the question of his greatness
42
43
44
45
46

Christian Century, (Chicago), Disciples of Christ,
Mar. 20, 1913. .
March 5, 1913.
April 10, 1913.
Aug. 21, 1913.
May 27, 1915.

was still debated.

~When

.'
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time enough has past to permit ot a

right perspective, we believe that justice will be done his
memory~

was the eulogy of the +ndeQ~dent.47

But most of the

other papers preferred to ttlet time:weittough pass" before committing themselves to an evaluation of Madero.

How impolitic

it might prove to alienate oneself from Huerta1

It was only
.
after the dictator's power evidenced serious weakness that
the

~tandarq

voiced its opinion "for Madero as an exceptional

man ••• He died a martyr to the cause of humble natives".48
The

Watchman-~x~miner

took up the chorus in lamenting that

"Mexico's greatest loss was in the foul murder of Madero, an
unselfish patriot and a martyr to his efforts to redeem Mexico tt • 49

A feature article in the New Age by Jose Castellot,

the Grand Commander of the

~Jasons

in Mexico, leaves little

doubt of its sentiments:

"

With the faith 0 f the inspired with the fortitude of the
Apostle, Madero scattered everywhere his Gospel of love, of community of good ••• But he was an
apostle rather than a ruler, a
dreamer rather than a st~tesman.
Madero could not keep the promises made, nor check the natural

47
48

March 6, 1913.
Jan. 3, 1914.

49

(Cincinnati), Feb. 12, 1914;
The WatchmaQ was affiliated with the Examiner.

Wat~~~-Examiner,

,
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reaction caused by the disillusionment of the people. 50
INTERVENTION OR ANNEXATION

The downfall of Madero ens,o',araged many people to believe that the only solution of Mexican problems was annexation under some form.

The once peace-loving

IndeRend~,

now completely dissatisfied with the Jharchy south of the
border, could see
absolutely no reason w'hy, if any
portion of Mexico should be annexed it would have to remain as
a subject of possession with no
hope of admission to statehood.
This would put an end to her problem. 5l
The next week, however, the editors moderated their policy to
an offer of United States' help in union with several South
American nations, and it concluded in a manner quite baffling

-

to its previous week's readers with the warning that "we must
keep hands off, however much Americans may desire annexation
and even intervention lt • 52

During the next week, just to main-

tain some consistency, it urged "President Wilson to follow
Taft' s poli~y of non-intervention".53

But two weeks later..,a

flicker of the old light must have returned for the paper
50
51
52
53

New ~S!!,
Feb. 20,
Feb. 27,
March 6,

(Washington), Masonic, Feb. 1915.
1913.
1913.
1913.

.'
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could not see "how it would be conside!'ed intervention, if the
northern states wanted to secede from Mexico and become annexed to the United States't .54

The Christian Centurx failed

.

to see eye to eye with the lBdepende~t~and offered a solution
on an entirely different pattern:
During all this what has the
Uni ted. states done? Sh# has done
nothing worthy of her ideals or
her precedents ••• Her diplomatic
measures have .been anything but
creditable ••• if our government
had played a stronger hand the
life of Madero might have been
spared, and the reforms which he
advocated might have been substantially accomplished. It
would not have required interventionl ••• We do not favor war ••• Now 55
only the churches can bring peace.
S. G. Inman, the missioner, who later appeared before the
United States Senate's Investigation Committee on the Mexican Affair, confirmed the Qgristian Centurx's policy in a special
article stating that 'fintervention would not solve Mexico's
problems any more than the 'iron hand' did - but only the religion of Jesus Christ lf • 56
six weeks
54
55
56

la~er

It is the same Mr. Inman, who is

featuring another article on the virtues of

Mar. 20, 1913.
Mar. 20, 1913.
April 20, 1913.

,

.'
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Carranza, the new patron of his Protestant Institute in Mexieo lf • 57
Vii th Woodrow \-lilson's inauguration in March, all

.

eyes were turned towards Washington;'iir expectation of a
formal statement of policy.

There were hints of opposition

to Huerta given in his early addresses, but nothing was
defini tee
the

•

By July, the press was impatient.

~hristian

According to

Advocate's sense of justice
••• it is an inconsistency for the
United States to recognize the
Chinese Republic, concerning the
desirability of which there is
room to doubt, while d~nying the
same favor to Mexico. 58

The irritation of the Christian !!erald at Wilson's failure
to provide a Mexican program was put as forcibly as its conservative policy would allow at this early stage of the new
Administrationl

"

Our Government has been patient and forebearing - perhaps
too long - but a point has now
been reached where further tolerance ceases to be a virtue and
the adoption of a firm and definite policy becomes an imperative
duty. We owe it to other powers,
no less than to ourselves ••• This
does not necessarily mean intervention. 59
.1

57
58
59

July 3, 1913.
July 10, 1.913.
July 30, 1913.

.'

-

.'
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While the Watchman deplored the Administration's inaction, yet
it became alarmed at the report of Secretary Bryan's greedy
desire to annex our southern neighbor, and if the report was
true, it warned him of the ttchimera11p '~hat would result. 60 The
only point the Standard wanted to insist on with the President
was that "war with Mexico must be avoided at all coststt. 61
The

~ndependent,

•

however, still retained its patience with

Wilson because
Presumably the Administration has
complete knowledge of the elements
in the situation. And it is the
Administration, with the aid of
Congress, that must decide what we
shall do. 62
The diplomatic world was more than surprised when
the action of the White House Head was restricted to sending
a personal representative to Mexico to report secretly to
him on affairs there.

_

His choice was the unfrocked, divorced

clergyman, William Bayard Hale.

The Watchman, now disgusted,

sarcastically referred to Hale as the diplomat, who
• •• having been in the count~ two
months natl1raJJ),,63 knows all about
the country, the people and the
remedies needed. So President Wilson has taken his advice rather
60
61
62
63

July 30, 1913.
Aug. 16, 191.3.
July 31, 1913.
In the original, the word was in italics.

.'
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than that of an accredited repr~
sentative of the United States. 4
MISSION OF LIND
Hale's mission resulted in,the recall of the Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, which the Presbyterian
Banner considered as lithe first step in President Wilson's
Mexican policy".65 Enamored by the d\batable achievement of
his first representative, the President decided again to ignore the counsel of Congress, and instead, send another personal agent to Mexico, John Lind.

His success in Mexico was

most doubtful as far as the Independent could see:
Ex-Governor Lind of Minnesota,
special representative of President
Wilson and adviser to the United
States Embassy, cannot be regarded
as a man having exceptional qualifications for the mission •• ~We presume that Lind was selected by
Secretary Bryan, whom he greatly
admires ••• It seemed to us that the
work might better have been done
by a commission of eminent A~5ri
cans clothed with authority.

-

The Presbyterian Banner, nevertheless, believed that "things
are more optimistic in regard to the Mexican situation now
that Lind has arrived in Mexico Cityu. 67 There was a hopeful

.

'

note heard from the
64
65
66
67

Aug. 21, 1913.
Aug. 7, 1913.
Aug. 14, 1913.
Aug~

14, 1913.

~stian ~ald

too, because

71
Lind is said' to be a practical,
clear-headed man; and although
the sending of a personal envoy
on such a mission is a striking
innovation in diplomacy, the result of the experiment may prove
it to have been whol~·-.Justified. 68
Two weeks later, though, the optimism of the PresbyteriAn
Banner was considerably dampened when Huerta refused Lindts
proposals.

.

Sadly it quoted a Mexican Dailys
John Lind has come to Mexico to
assure the election against v.
Huerta ••' .now there is not an
honest Mexican soul, who will
not vote for Huerta •••President
Wilson has taken it upon himself
to crystallize the popularity of
Huerta until he has become the
incarnation of n~gional dignity
and sovereignty.

When the bright sun of peace fail.ed to break through the
blackness of anarchy two months later, the Independent looked_
on the appointment of Lind as

~an

irregularity ••• which was

highly offensive to, irritating and humiliating to the Mexican nation".70
To save face and his c:ontrol of Congress, the
President

~as

Lind mission.
68
69
70

forced to cover over the blotch, that was the
His scheme was a message to Congress.

Aug. 20, 1913.
Sept. 4, 1913 - herein is quoted the
1913.
Nov. 13, 1913.

"I!

Diario~

.

'

In this

Aug. 28,

72

talk he not only
he painted the

If

took the members into his confidence, but

re~&on

for the Lind fiasco in the lively col-

ors of a humane mission.

This message was greeted by the

.

Christian Iierald as "the plain and thl!.dorned recital of a
humane and worthy effort which meets the general approval of
the country".71

The

over by the address:

Indepen~ent

.

was also temporarily won

"The American people have reason to be

proud of President Wilson's address to Congress ••• he counseled patience •••we should do well to follow his advice".72
Even prouder was the

§~an~~

that

••• at least one great nation can
inaugurate a new kind of diplomacy in which moral considerations have a place, and we believB
it will be ultimately successful.or a
Even after two months of no success, its exuberance was not
lessened:
It is a noble policy. The President should be given a fair
chance to work out the giant task
he has set himself that the nation may be worthy of its motto,
uIn God we trust tt • 74
The

boastin~

of the Christian Century sounded like a school-

boy, holding that "President Vlilson in his dealings with
71
72
73
74

Sept. 10, 1913.
Sept. 4, 1913.
Sept. 6, 1913.
Nov. 8, 1913.

.'
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.

Mexico is standing upon a principle more advanced than has
ever before formed the basis of international policy".75

The

faith of the Independent, however, was greatly shaken in Wilson' s purely humane in.tentions,

when;p~e

of its special cor-

respondents wrote from Mexico that the President was affiliating himself with Carranza.

He asked:

.

Is Carranza in any way superior to Huerta? Has he not bloody
hands? •• In refusing to ever recognize Huerta, the administration
has violated our usage an~6the
dictates of common sense.
In his dealings with Mexico, Wilson had placed great
stress on the necessity of popular elections in that land.

It

was this aspect of his policy that caused the WatchmanEx~~iner

to take pause; for if four-fifths of the nation was

under the dictator's control, it seemed reasonable to advise
If

President Wilson not to urge popular elections now tt • 77

Yet

-

Wilson would not accept advice, and the elections were held.
The edi toria~ column of the f,resbyterign
sult:
The

told the re-

tiThe dread spectre of a dictator has arisen in Mexico".78

Indep.!m:~

.~.there

75
76
77
78

~~

wrote that "Huerta has made himself dictator

.'

remains not even the pretense of constitutional gov-

Nov. 13, 1913.
Dec. 11, 1913.
Sept. 18, 1913.
Oct. 16, 19~3.

74

ernment tt • 79

The Watchman-E~~miner now sat back with the ttl

told you solt attitude as it commented that "only 10,000 out
of 80,000 vo"ted tt ; it also added that tfthe Catholic Party

.

had the majority, but the election ~a~ not constitutionally
valid lf • 80 And two issues later it referred to the elections
as Ita farce". 81

WAR THREATENS
The result of Huerta's defiance of Washington's
order for a more democratic form of government by his controlle~elections

was to raise the intervention issue again.

The question was asked, and an answer was given by the Inde..J2enden t:
What is the duty of the United
States in this fateful crisis?
Patience ••• to avoid war ••• Firmness in protecting property and
persons ••• ~d disinterestedness
of motiv,e. 2
The Advance counseled its readers to ltfollow Wilson and Bryan who are disposed to do the right thing ••• yet let us be
calm and pray for peace u • 83 The Christian Centurl was well

..
79
80
81
82
83

Oct. 23,
Oct. 30,
Nov. 13,
Oct. 23,
Advance,

1913.
1913.
1913.
1913.
(Chicago), Congregationalist, Nov. 13, 1913.

75

aware o£ the "critical situation", as well as our obl:::igations
to "protec t the interests of Americans in Mexico tf , ye"lt it reminded its readers that
••• it is a good time ~o~ Americans to keep calm ••• We have been
hurried into at least one war if
not two, in response to men who
showed more ability to shout
than to exercise good s~seM.84
In the next issue the readers were warned against ttthee jingo
press ••

~and

demands for war o£ big munition £irms like.

Krupps, Armstrong, and Maxims, ••• as well as the sentimcents
o£ army and naval officers".85

The strongest o£ all WTarnings

against intervention was that of the Christian

Advoca~e,

who

£rankly told Washington that "there has not, at this v, riting,
appeared any excuse for the introduction of American soldiers
86
on Mexican soil tt •
Wi th the advent of 1914, the nation as a who Ie
still was determined to have peace.

And when the lnde:oendm

heard that the Administration was considering a change
policy leading to intervention, it sharply admonished
ton that
Intervention means war. War
means an expenditure of millions
o£ dollars, the loss of untold
lives, and a consolidated hatred
84
85
86

Nov. 20, 1913.
Nov. 27, 1913.
Nov. 20, 1913.

of
~ashing-

r
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on the part of all Latin AmeriPatience, and
still more patien~e ••• must be
our watchword ••• 8

can countries.

The Christian Herald, though, tel\'j;,hat "while that nation
stands tor peace, it also stands for justice tl , and because
we tailed to take that attitude previously ttentanglements in
our diplomatic relations now prevail~.88
Wilson did change his policy and it was just as the
~ndard

had foretold the previous November, when the editor

"figured that the next step is inevitably litting the embargo tt • 89 On February 3, 1914, the Standard's prophecy came
true with the raising ot the Embargo on Arms to Mexico, which
thus enabled the border states, according to the Presbyterian

Ban!!~ "to SUPL)ly immediately 30,000 troopsH.90

The act re-

sulted in a mild furor, which was a juicy morsel for the
hungry press.

..

87
88
89
90

Jan.
Feb.
Nov.
July

13,
11,
22,
14,

The

Independen~

analysed

The President's order lifting the
embargo ••• as a logical and natural and proper outcome of his policy towards that distant country
••• The President has removed the
handicap which hampered the forces
opposed to the blood-stained
usurper in the capita1 ••• The United
1914.
1914.
1913 ..
1914.

77
States will continue its wise
course of "watchful waiting".91
The Watchman-Examiner interpreted this move as Wilson's way
lt
of saying ttnow fight it out and may.,. the
.., best man win • 92
.

"By this act of the President", the Christian

Centur~

dog-

matically asserted, "we are actively allied with the rebels~93
Only sadness and sarcasm however coul! be found in the Ch!1!tian Advocate's leading editorial:
In the year of Our Lord, fight
on, is the practical significance
of the President's proclamation
lifting the embargo ••• it has kind
of an ironical flavor in view of
our boast that we are a Christian
nation. 94

The Christia1'\ Herald too, could see only nthe tragic possibili ties in the new situation not pleasing to contemplate!t
Common sense and hard-headed reasoning characterized the
Advance's attack on the situation as it urged us "to pause
and take out our pencils before we talk too much about war
with Mexico or any other nation.

War costs too much".96

This editorial was followed with proper acknowledgements by
the Christian Century, which calculated that
91
92
93
94
95
96

Feb. 16, 1914.
Feb. 12, 1914.
May 14, 1914.
Feb. 26, 1914.
Feb. 18, 1914
Feb. 26, 1914.

95

-
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••• the amount which the world
pays for post war in interests
a1one ••• if gathered into one
pile of one dollar bills would
make a ~tack fifty-two miles
high ••• 7
...._ '..,.
War, too, was the fear of the Presbyterian Banner, for
••• if Huerta admits his powerlessness to check the lawlessness of
Carranza and Villa becduse of the
help given to the Constitutionalists by our government, it would
leave President Wilson n~8a1ternative but to intervene.
The White House, however, was confident that if
Huerta could be removed from power, there would be no need
for intervention, much less war.

It was common knowledge

that Englandts support of the dictator was one of the main
obstacles to making the President's plan a reality.

Wil-

son, therefore, was determined to have his friends across
the sea step into his line of policy.

The string our wily

executive pulled on this occasion to remove our British
brethren from Huerta's support was the repeal of the free
Panama Canal tolls for the coastwise steamers of the United
States.

Since such maneuverings smacked of backroom po1i-. '

tics, few of the religious papers cared to associate themselves by comment, or were-totally unaware of any connection
97
98

Mar. 5, 1914.
Mar. 19, 1914.
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between the Panama Canal and Mexico.
~as

The Presbyterign Banner

of this latter class, in addition to the fact, that it

could not conceive of a Presbyterian President dirtying his
hands in sordid politics.

Its

.

indiga~ion

then knew no

bounds 'Then Senator Jones of Washington accused \Vilson of

,.

bargaining the Canal toll for British support of his Mexican
policy:
"Mr. Wilson said even if he wanted
to he could get no suggestion
from the British Minister on the
subject of Mexico wi th a tfCO~k
screw" ••• His (Senator Jones) 9
false statement traveled with
seven league boots over the world
and lodged in thousands of minds
where it will never be overtaken
by truth. Men in public places
••• should inquire into the truth
of damagi~ rumors before spreading them. 00
The

Christ~~~ Qentur~,

however, judged the affair in the

light of good diplomacy, since
••• the truth is that American
and Great B~itain need and are
certain to need each other's
friendship. Our relations
with Mexico are far from satisfactory and Mexico and Japan
are maintaining an appearance
of friendship, which inclines
the United States to make the
most of its friendship with
99 Insertion of the proper name is the authort s.
~oo Mar. 6, 1914.

.'

80

Great Britain ••• England can help
us much with Japan because she
is friendly with that nation.~Ol
TAMPICO INCIDENT

.

An incident, insignificant·1:h itself, occurred that

added just one more element to the Mexican mess, and resulted
in serious consequences.

On April 21, 1914, President Wilson

•

asked Congress for troops to force Huerta to offer the demanded apology for the alleged flag insult.

The Advance,

caught in the wa.ve of patriotism, upheld the demand that tt'the
American flag receive an unconditional salute of 21 guns as
reasonable and dignified and the refusal to comply would be
a national affront tt • 102 It was a case of having your cake
and eating it too, when the Watchman-Examiner made clear that
"without a doubt the insolence of the usurper should be rebuked, but it will be a calamity if we are plunged into
war"" .103

The Christian Advocate was of the opinion that ftthe

Government of the United States has been treated with intol101
102

103

Reb. 26, 1914.
April 23, 1914. The ""flag insult" refers to the Tampico
incident, where through misunderstanding, some Americans,
sailors, were momentarily arrested. Admiral Mayo de-·'
manded an unjust flag salute, which Huerta refused to
give. President Wilson backed his Admiral to the extent
of asking Congress for armed forces. Cf. Chapter I, 37.
April 23, 1914.

-
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erable contempt by Huerta and his menials".104
so grave in the eyes of the

Livin~

The issue was

Church that the editor for-

got its strictly religious policy for a moment to write:

ttlf

war must come, it will at least be agreed that the United
states did not seek it".105

As was expected, the Christian

Herald voiced its opinion against the dictator in the obser-

.

vation that "the time has come for us to draw the line.

Huerta

must mend his ways and begin by saluting the flag he had insu1ted~106

Even the Christj.!¥l Century was willing to endorse

the use of force ftto run down the murderer and bandit who has
heaped indignities upon the United States".107

In the next

issue, the Christian Herald came out openly in the same strain
and maintained that Ifwhile it was not an advocate of war •••
·when it becomes inevitable, nothing remains but to face it".108
Another approach too, was offered to justify the mobilizing of ....
armed fore es in the Standard's reflecti on that ttthe saluting
incident was a mere culmination. It was Huerta's attitude
rather than a specific act ••• MI09
104
105
106
107
108
109

April 2~, 1914.
April 25, 1914.
April 29, 1914.
April 30, 1914.
May 6, 1914.
May 9, 1914.
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This fanatical patriotism in support of Wilson and
the flag, however, was not universal.

To the Presbyterian

Banner goes the honor of attacking the patriotism of war advocates.

Although in the beginning)'i 1;. was almost apologetic:

"There is some feeling, if intervention had to come, it would
have been better to wait for a more worthy occasion~;110

•

when its editors, during the n ext week, saw how many papers
were infected by this war fever, they fel t i t their duty,
insofar as their Presbyterian loyalty to the President would
allow, to reveal the awful truth that he had used the flag
salute as a pretext for war:
••• it was their regret that the
President did not wi thhold his
hand longer, especially as the
immediate occasion of action
qnly S!1 inte~I!.S~ionaI !ierernony. 11

wai

The influence of these editorials spread rapidly.
~

The Stand-

reconsidered its initial stand, and now "regretted the

loss of life caused by the occupation

0

f Vera Cruz, especially

since ample apology had been given by Huerta at Tampico" .112
The IndeRendept merely echoed the sentiments of the Banner:
"

110
111
112

Serious causes exist for a
vital interest of the United
States in Mexico ••• But are we to
tell our children in years to
come that the people of the

April 23, 1914.
April 30, 1914.
May 2, 1914.

The underlining is the

author's~

.'
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united States in 1914 had no
better reason for entering a
neighboring country and killing its people than a dispute
about a salute ••• You do not
need il~team hammer to crack
nuts.
.• '...,
In a leading article of the same issue, the reason for the
President's action is revealed:

•

•• • the President probably saw
that his policy of "watchful
waiting" was a failure when he
heard that Huerta had received
a loan of 60 million dollars.
So he brought on a wail~y the
seizure of Vera Cruz.
There was no surprise in the Chris"ti,ian Century's us.ing
another paper's policy, but it was amusing, after its last
outburst, to witness the superior air it adopted, when it
realized that Itthere was something pathetic about the wave
of passion and war fever that

ha~

swept over the country be-

cause of the irritating and insulting conduct of a half-breed
Indian".115

And the following week it seemed to be laughing

at itself, when it reflected that "as a matter of fact the
Tampico incident was not deserving of such serious consideration and biuster".116

The Advance, too forgetful of its

r

previous war cry, now warned its readers tlnot to be egged on
113
114
115
116

May
May
May
May

4, 1914.
4, 1914.
7, 1914. Another example was given on p. 78.
14, 1914.

-
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by loud mouthed politicans and by covetous capitalists".

1~7

Later in an editorial on the eighteen blue jackets who died
at Vera Cruz, its note was not a hollow sound,
ful plea to all Americans to learn

~rem

b~t

a prayer-

their recent mistake:

Let there be no war, if we
can have an honorable peace.
Let the nation bare its head
and ride in solemn and~ilent
procession behind these eighteen coffins. If we shall have
learned to pause and consider
before taking some rash step
that might plunge us into a
preventable war, these eightisn
will not have died in vain.
ABC Mediation
Whether the nation wished to send their sons to
fight south of the border or not, these lads would have had
to answer the bugle call of duty, except for the timely intervention of three leading South American Republics.

Ar-

gentina, Brazil and Chile, the famed Mediation Board, offered to mediate the differences between the two nations.
I

For the moment war was averted.

Strangely, though, the

Christian Advocate was not too enthusiastic about "the good
offers of the South American Republics ••• which are well iRtentioned, but cannot accomplish all the sentimentalists
117
118

May 7, 1914.
May 21, 1914.

.'
assume possible or probable~.119

It was

85

pure expediency too

that prompted the Standard to consider the offer "as a brief
respite tor our Government from l;ts anxious predicament at
.• "7
Vera Cruz". 120 Fortunately, the other pap ers had cheerier
outlooks.

The Christian Herald expressed the confident belief

that "although the task of the ABO'...Representatives was not
easy ••• yet the friends of peace everywhere have reason to welcome the new development as a hopeful sign of the progress of
the peace movement".121

Satisfaction was manifested by the

Advance with a pun on the "ABC mediation as being rather simple for so great a nation, but one can afford to begin with
the alphabet for the sake of peace".122 Yet none could touch
the Independent in exuberance:

..

The splendid action of the ABC
powers gives bright promise of
a solution of the immediate
problem of the avoidance ot war
with Mexico. It contains the
germ of a possible solution ot
all the great problems that harass the people of Mexico ••• Wilson and Bryan in accepting the
offer show a political genius
123
equalled only by their humanity •

For the Christian Q~nturx "this board was - it is - theO"only
119
120
121
122
123

April 30, 1914.
May 2, 1914.
May 3, 1914.
May 7, 1914.
May 4, 1914.

.'
hope'•• 124

The tone of the Presbyterian Banner was also mild

as it "welcomed mediation";125

but even that enthusiasm

died down in the dread that "Carranza would prove to be the
fly in the

0

in tmen t" .126

Again the

.!, £Ving

Church dep'arted

from strictly religious issues to make clear to the medi-

.

ators that

••• the Tampico incident and that
connected with Mr. O'Shaughnessey's mail are not the chief issues, but rather Madero's assassina tion due to Huerta ani2~e
welfare of our citizens".
Then when the avoidance of war for the time passed from the
dream stage to reality, the

Ind~endent,

whose confidence

was ne ver shaken in the Mediation Board in the darkest hours,
surpassed all in sounding its praises:
The Niagara Falls Mediation
Conference is likely to prove
one of the most important milestones in the progress of New
World civilization ••• The war is
averted. But something even better has been accomplished. Not
only do Mexico and all Pan-America perceive the disinterestedness
of the United States ••• but the nations of America unlike the nations of Europe can work disinterestedly and in harmony for the mutual prospe~~y and peace of a
hemisphere.
124
125

May 14, 1914.
May 7, 1914.

!~~ ~~el~l'l~lt~·
128

June 1~, 1914.

.'
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CONDEMNATION OF HUERTA
Peace might be restored to Mexico, but it could
only be temporary unless a leader was elected who had the

.

confidence and control of the people~~ Huerta, Carranza and
Villa were the three possible choices.

The Standard was op-

posed to Huerta from the beginning, chiefly for his "currying favor with the Catholic Party and attempting to

0

btain

its support ••• the official influence is being felt against
evangelicals tt • 129 By June, 1914, the Standard had stooped
to mudslinging in its denunciation of Huerta as
••• the drunken sot who ia impassible even as a decent
representative of a barbarous
state to make no mention of
him as the head of a fi5icivilized government.
When the pressure from Washington finally resulted in the
dictator's resignation, the

Christi~

Heralq, which had been

quietly but persistently agitating for interference in Mexican affairs, expressed its satisfaction in that frequent
half-assured manner:

"What looks like a tremendous victory

for the highest idealism in international affairs has been
r

won by the final elimination of Uuerta".13l

A:tter the world

saw that the ex-president was sincere in his resignation, the
129 Mar. 13, 1914.
130 June 13, 1914.
131 July 29, 1914.
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beaten dictator no longer provided press material except for
those papers, whose delight is to bring a skeleton out of
the closet.

50 one reads in the

~

.Age

of the following

year that in Huerta was Itthe retrog;a~ation toward military
dictatorship so abhorred to the principles of modern civili~ationtt.132

The Baptists too found a Feat difficulty in

forgetting Huerta, and the Standard conjectured that
••• had the United States recognized Huerta we should have lying at our door tod~ not only
the grievances of Villa, but
the accusations of 16 millions
of Mexicans that we compounded
a felony and shared in one of
t~e gre~test crimes of modern
t llne s .. J.33
Perhaps, the sharpest of all the attacks on the Mexican General was that of the Methodist Review, whose ulterior motive
was to make the darkly tarnished Carranza appear brilliant
by contrast:

"

Thanks to the sensitive conscience, the wise forbearance,
and the superhuman foresight of
the noble man seated in the
White House at Washington, the
red-handed Huerta was refused
recognition by the United
5tates ••• Huerta was another
Diaz..
The tool of the autocrat,
the blood-thirsty, spectacular

132 Feb~u .. , 1915.
1.33 Jan. II 1916.
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Huerta surprised, shocted and
finally terrified the great
sober-minded masses of the
United States, and they were
not slow to approve of the 134
policy of President i'l.il:son
•
...,
It should be understood, however, that Victoriano

.

Huerta was not a universal outcast.

For shortly after the

ttflag incident", the Christian Century.ran a brief series of
pro-Huerta articles in the hope that these might lower in
some degree the war fever heating the blood of the American
people.

The first written by a college Professor pointed out

that
••• as a matter of fact, Huerta
has shown remarkable control.
His con4uct in his dealings
with the United States and Wilson has been characterized by

~~~~!~~~ ~~ ~r;~~:!~;~~~!35eThe second was the work of ' a well known Mexican miner who

-

showed that in his experience "the laborers ha ve been content
to have Huerta for their President ••• and as far as they are
able to think on large questions, have wondered what the
trouble is between Huerta and the United states tt • 136

The

most positive appraisal of Huerta was the eulogy of the Pre§byterian Bgnner, which frequently would print the truth, even
134
135
136

July, 1916.
May 14, 1914.
May 21, 1914.

Fred Starr of Chicago U. was the author.
Irving Herr of Mexico wrote this article.

,
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it it was contrary to its pet policies; and the following editorial was all the mare positive, because it was an answer to
the unjust tirade ot the Standard against Huertat

137

·
••• Huerta was not le~~emarkable
a man than Diaz. It anything he
was more remarkable. But he lived
at a later date ••• Huerta has been
much misrepresented and much misunderstood. Not a tew 'ave supposed him part Indian and wholly
an ignorant peasant and a drunken,
brutal sot to boot. Throughout
the past tive months he has shown
himselt to be what he was, a
gentleman, an~8istocrat ot the
highest type.
CARRANZA, THE VICTOR

After Huerta resigned, the leadership ot Mexico was
lett to Villa and Carranza to tight over and Zapista, a most
unlikely choice.

The silence

ot the Protestant press gave

indications ot battlement; both the prospective candidates
were bandits and unscrupulous ones at that.

It became essen-

tial to back the right horse, tor a wrong choice might prove
disastrous to their future missionary work in Mexico.

With

the tuture of both ot these men so uncertain in 1914, little
was said ot them in the papers, except for the Christian

~

tury, which occasionally highlighted the tavor shown by Car137

138

This is the June 13, 1914 editorial quoted on p. 87.
July 23, 1914.

-
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ranza to the Protestant Biblical Institute. 139

Once the

,Qhristian Advocate went out to boost Carranza "as the most
capab 1 e

.p
o~

. h'~ng a s t a b1 e governmen t '~n.Mex~co
. tt ; 140
esta b l~s

but in December it was calling him an'..,ttupstart 1t .141

All Car-

ranza enthusiasts however were embarrassed by the Independent's query concerning tithe blood on Carranza's hands tt .142
According to the Presbyterian Banner "~arranza was proving
himself a most stubborn customern • 143 Villa, too, during
these days would have found it difficult to fill his scrapbook with clippings from the Protestant press.

V/ith the ex-

ception of the Watchman-Examiner, which looked up to him as
tithe man to bring permanent peace tt ;l44 and the Standard's
evaluation of him as ttthe ladder by which Carranza alone could
rise",145 kind words were wanting. Several papers in fact
looked down on "this barbarian u .. 146
Carranza, however, was going to find 1915 a banner
year, because a combination of Washington propaganda, Villa
brutality and the New London Conference provided him with excellent, but not too stable stepping stones to reach the reins

-----..-.. ' 139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Sept. 19, 1914; Oct. 24, 1914.
Sept. 24, 1914 ..
Dec .. 3, 1914.
Dec. 13, 1914 ..
July 23, 1914.
Dec. 10, 1914.
Jan. 23, 1915.
Christian Herald, April 12, 1914;
Oct. 1, 1914.

Christi~

Advocate,

....

92

of p·ower.

.'

Then, another factor came into play, which almost

universally united the Protestants in his support.

It was

the Catholic opposition in the United States to the recognition

0

f this persecutor.

The Chrk~ian Herald was among

the first to realize the significance of this new era, when

.

it rejoiced that

••• Carranza has urged all true
patriots to combine their
strength against any reestablishment of the Church ••• Mexico
is getting free. 147
The open Carranza support came after the New London
Conference, when the United States, in union wi til a large
number of South American Republics, recognized the First
Chief as Mexico's new president.

ttLight begins to dawn" was

the Presbyterian ~annert~ reaction;l48

while the Watchman-

m.~aminer now hailed Carranza as "most trustworthy» .149

Now

that the ground seemed secured with United states' recognition, the

~§~ian

Herald abandoned its conservative re-

straint:
..

~47

148
149

The American people are
glad to greet Carranza as
President of Mexico ••• From all
that can be learned Carranza
stands for the people of Mexico ••• His success will mark

May 21, 1915.
Oct. 10, 1915.
Nov. 14, 191&.

,

·'

not only the beginning of a new
history 0 f Mexico, but an advanced step in the history of
liberty, democracy, clean business and clean1~8vernmentt
Viva Carranza1
. '..,.
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.

In its jubilation the Christian

Advoca~e

also managed to

strike a sarcastic note against Catholics:
It is Cardinal Gibtons who
sets the tone, and the wail has
been taken up all down the line.
Why is the good Cardinal pitying Mexico?~.Order has been restored to such a point that
President Wilson and his advisors feel justified in recognizing the existence of a de facto
government ••• All signs ¥&int to
a dawning of a new day_
~ere

it not for their agreement in endorsing Carranza's per-

secution

0

f the Church, one would wonder if the Advocate and

Standard were talking about the same man.

For the

Stand~rd

voiced the opinion that
••• for other reasons (than the
persecution of Catholics)~52
we are against recognition Carranza does not control the
country ••• Carranza has become
a white hope which is neither
very white nor very promising. 153
150 Nov. 10, 1915.
151 Dec. 9, 1915.
152 Taken from the previous context of the article.
153 Nov. 13, 1915.

-

.'
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THE VIILSON" STAR 11 ANES
The year 1915 too centered attention on Woodrow
Wilson in the Mexican problem, but he would perhaps have preferred less notoriety.

The nation wai'becoming irritated not

only at keeping the Mexican sore open by his "watchful wait-

.
meddling, which in time would demand mediation from outside.

ing" policy, but by causing it to fester wi th his occasional

In high rage the IndepeI!den.;t thought "it high time the President took the country into his confidence and let them know
what he has in mind" .154

Two months later when the si tuation

was growing darker, the explanation demanded of Wilson by the
Independen~

was even more difficult to give, for
why we send the American Navy to
Mexican waters to demand a redress for an incidental insult
to the American flag, and yet
have done nothing to protect the
lives and property of foreigners
- American and otisswise - in
Mexico territory.

Soon there was grumbling, when it complained that "Wils'on in
translating his convictions into action has fallen into seri•
156
ous i nconsistencies".

On the other hand, the AdVance pre-

ferred "to hold Woodrow Wilson in high regard", while it
154
155
156

Nov. 30, 1915.
Jan. 25, 1915.
Feb. 25, 1915.
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blamed Itthe Administration for holding a policy in Mexico
marked by great unsteadiness of purpose and not a wholly open
mind tt • 157

Then, when the anarchy became so widespread during

.

March, 1915, the Independent advocat8d""a new policy:
••• the time had come when a strong
hand from wi thout must be laid upon the clashing factions that
peace may be restored •• iBut it ~g~t
be a Pan-American intervention.
The

Presb~teri~

Banner was in full sympathy with such a

measure and was certain that

11

even the President is weary of

his watchful waiting policy and is on the p oint of intervening" .159

The return

0

f the dread spectre of war was the straw

that broke the back of the Christian Herald's patience with
the President's policy, since it was convinced that
••• the bloodshed in Mexico could
have been prevented ••• for in the
matter of foreign relations and
in making decisions that might
lead us into war, the Constitution ••• gives far too much opportunity of inde~66dent action to
the President.
The Protestant papers were momentarily won back by
the President with his recognition of Carranza and the hope

.'

for peace; but such prospects soon vanished with new and more
157
158
159
160

Feb.
Mar.
June
June

11, 1915.
22, 1915.
3, 1915.
16, 1.915.

.'
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vigorous attacks of Villa against the First Chief.
Christ~

The

Herald, however, as the newly recognized President's

staunchest supporter, begged that "Carranza be given a fair

.
....
opportunity of his proving his ability to cope with

and ample

the situation tt • 161 Yet after Carranza refused to cooperate
with us in preventing Villa's border
~d

t~w.n

raids, the Stand-

predicted that
our unpreparedness in coping with
the si tuation is' certain to be an
important factor in the popular
decisions next November as to who
will be the nei~2President of the
United States.

The crisis actually became so serious after a skirmish between Carranza's soldiers and American forces, that even the
Christia~

Herald doubted Carranza's peaceful intentions and

admitted that
••• once again the country has
be.en brought to the verge of war
.Hif it is war, let tlS face it
bravely and unflinchingly, knowing that we have so~~t nothing
but simple justice.
The continued insults of Carranza to our Government were fast sacrificing him his popularity in the United
States.
161
162
163

Nevertheless, he still had a few champions in the

Jan. 26, 1916.
May 20, 1916.
July 5, 1916.

,.'"
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northern republic, among them the Methodist

Revie~.

Yet when

one considers the chaos in Mexico during th is pe r1 od, its
editor made the Review appear quite ridiculous by allowing an
article to be printed that heralded ~ke
••• gradual spread of the arts of
peace under his leadership which
is proving beyond all doubt that
in Carranza we have a man of superior personal qualiG~es and of
lofty statesmanship.
The Christian gerald, however, was wise as well as loyal and
it was well aware of the possible harm wrought to the cause
by a direct defense.

So it drew on the ever-rich reserve of

favorable sentiment:

It blamed Carranza's troubles on the

misrepresentation of the Catholic Church:
The attitude of the revolution to the Church has been the
subject of a long campaign of
misrepresentation which forms
the basis of a concerted attack
by the Catholics of this countryon Mr. Wilson's policy ••• An
example: The atrocities of
which the Carranzistas - these
165
are insignificant and negligible.
It was only the world war that saved Carranza.
~

The

iure recogni ti on extended to our next door ne igh bor on.,

March 3, 1917, was not an admission of Carranza's success in
the Presidency, nor endorsement of Woodrow Wilson's policy 164
165

July, 1916.
Aug. 9, 1916.

.'

98

for we had just abandoned the pursuit of Villa a month ago in
utter disgust with Mexican affairs - but it was a move of
expediency to allow the President to devote his energies to
Europe.

.

The Protestant press, almos~ tniversally accepted

with satisfaction the formal recognition as the finale of
the whole sorry business.

,.

The Standard, though, could not

fool itself, and an article in early 1917 summed up perfectly
the result of Woodrow Wilson's years of meddling:
The Carranza movement which
was hailed as the dawning of a
new era, has but plunged the
country deeper into the night of
chaos, and utter hopelessness. 166
That the Protestant press considered the PJexican
crisis of great moment and our President's policy wise is a
self-evident conclusion.

The Catholic press too viewed the

tragedy of our southern neighbor with concern, even a deeper
concern, because the Mexican nation racked by revolution and
overrun with anti-clerical politicians was traditionally
Catholic.

In the past, the Catholic press generally had re-

.

frained from editorials on political issues, but Wilson's
"

support of the tools of the anti-clericals, Carranza and
Villa, had exhausted the patience of even the most long-suffering of the Jobs, who edited the Catholic papers.
166

Jan. 13, 1.917.

An investi-

,
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gation of these Catholic papers then, will enable us to ex•

amine the other side of the tapestry on which was woven the
intricate and confusing pattern of United States-Mexican
politics. 167

•
167

Since the tone of the Protestant press, generally spehking, was definitely anti-Catholic whenever the interest
of the two conflicted, it is evident that the opinion
of the Catholic press will differ.
Examples of extreme bigotry in some editorials of a few
of the Protestant papers have been included in the appendix.

.'
CHAPTER I I I
THE ATTITUDE OF THE CATHOLIC PRESS
While the Protestant was

.

a ·etranger
t,o Mexico, the
...,

Catholic was at home, for the nation was Catholic.

This

phenomenon is easily understood, if one knows that the Spaniard had been the conqueror.

This codbuistador might have

lusted for gold, but he also thirsted for souls.

Wherever

he raised the Spanish flag, the missionary planted Christ's
Cross.

Nor did the Mexicans refuse to take up His Cross.

When our armies entered Mexico in 1846, they found the Faith
still thriving in city Cathedrals and wayside shrines.

Many

Catholics in our armies found it difficult to fight against
their brethren of the same Faith, and some even deserted.
The editors of the Catholic press in this country,
nevertheless, were invariably in favor of the United States
Government's policy, in spite of the fact that Whig Journalism consistently belabored the Administration and condemned
the war.

Most of the Catholic papers seem to have committed

themselves; consciously or unconsciously, to somewhat the
same policy.

."

The principles underlying this policy can be

grasped from the following representative editorial:

100

~

.'

~Ol

A press, particularly a Catholic
press, to be free should have no
communion with political parties;
not even the most remote; for,
if it has ••• the freedom of opinions under considerat±~n becomes
falsified, and is converted into
a sort of trumpet for tho'se who
patronize the paper.
The Catholic press should,
therefore, be as caref~l not to
suppress public opinio~against
the abuses of ttthe powers that
be", when they affect the rights
and privil.eges of the Catholic
body, as it is in not giving currency to crude and ~founded
charges against it.
Concretely, though, the policy might briefly be described as
being the publication, sometime at the beginning of the war,
of an editorial in support of the government and stating the
Catholic attitude.

After that, however, there was

litt~e

constructiye effort on the part of the press to build up a
spirit favorable to the war.

This was not due to a change

of attitude or a loss of interest.

Possibly, it was the re-

sult of a more dispassionate and clearer consideration of the
justice and necessity of the war by those who dictated the
4

policies of the papers.

Secondly, there was an honest regret

that the war was being fought against a Catholic country.·
Finally, the anti-bellum bias which was directed against the
1

Catholic Observer,

~oston,

June 5, 1857.

.'

~02

Mexicans by the sectarian and public press was a source
resentment.

Al~

o~

three of these reasons may not have held in

the case of each paper, but certainly, each of them had its
influence upon some one paper.

,

....

It must also be remembered

that the Catholic press as such was

~omparatively

young.

Most of the papers referred to here

h~d

short, or even a spasmodic career.

rt seems unwarranted to

had a more or less

subscribe to the idea that the Catholic press aligned itself
with the administration as a mere matter of policy_

However,

in view of the ordeals through which Catholics had passed
very shortly before at the hands of religious bigots, who
burned their churches and attacked their priests, it

wou~d

not have been strange if the papers had felt disinclined to
··
i n any controversy. 2
par t 1C1pate

The period between
entirely
icots

dif~erent

chie~

picture.

fervo~

Internal revolutions were Mex-

As in the Ii'irst Mexican War, a patri-

swept over the Catholic press when our soldiers

marched into Mexico.
2

however, presented an

problem, until our meddlings threatened to engulf

both nations in a war.
otic

1910-~9l7,

When the Washington Administration,

Sister Blanche l~rie M~Eniry, American Catholics ~ ~
War With Mexico, Catholic University, Washington, D.C.,
1937, Chapter II, Attitude of the Catholic Press, 13-33.

,

.'
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though, decided to

mo~lify

the Mexicans by abetting an anti-

clerical government, even the papers, which previously had

.•

confined themselves to the recording of conversions, ordin,,;,

ations, church building, and local trivials, felt bound to
raise their voice in protest.

'1'his growing consciousness of

the Catholic editor's duty to protest;gainst political policies, which threatened moral harm, marked out the Catholic
press during this period.
By the end of

~9l0,

the peace that Diaz had

brought to Mexico was suffering from his despotism.
turn of the century, the

~acred

Heart

~iview

at the

had endorsed

Diazts regime, for ttc.ompared with New England towns in morality, home comfort, and

wel~

being, the Mexican towns make

such a good showing~,3 yet within ten years many young Mexicans were c:onvinced that the democratic government of New
England was preferable to many of their
being".

The

~

ttessentials of well-

Maria, being North of the Rio Grande, was

able to express what many Mexicans judged better to keep in
their hearts:
When one of the very greatest men of his time rules with
wisdom and justice - it is certainly employing the phrase to
3

~ed

Heart Beview, Boston, Feb. 10, 1900.

signify what its very antithesis
would better express. 4
Except for America and a few scattered editorials like the
one above, little information on

I

th~~xican

situation, how-

ever, could be gleaned from the Catholic press.

America

sensed that Mexico, like an active volcano, was on the verge
j-

of eruption; and after it watched with a pitying eye the
eighth inauguration of Diaz, it uttered a tragic forecast
which was to be fulfilled to the letter:
In our opinion, the aged
President did not know when to
quit. He had made Mexico. When
he came in the people welcomed
him. He responded to their
hopes, expectations •••What lasting glory would have been that
of Diaz if he had recognized the
signs of the times and had gracefully bowed himself off the
stage while the audience was still
good natured or at least tolerantl
And now in the bitterness of his
heart, he hears the hurrahs of
yesterdayschanged into the curses
of today.
Yet there were still ardent admirers, who could not
conceive of-a defeated Diaz.

America, though; could read the

minds of the people, as they watched their oil and other resources leave the country under foreign management, and so it
4
5

~.!t Maria, South Bend, Feb. 7, 1910.
Americ~, New York, Dec. 3, 1910.
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bluntly remarked that " ••• many judge with misgiving the concessions to foreign capital".6

The confirmation of this ob-

servation came with the resignation of Diaz's cabinet early

even

in 1911, and America concluded that

Diaz ttrecognized

the evil" and Itadmits that there is now public opinion in
Mexic ott. 7 And when Diaz resigned, it bid him farewell with
a sigh of relief:

•

"Adios Diaz ••• Man can now speak".

8

As anarchy took a firmer hold on Mexico in the
years that followed, the Catholic press, which by then had
become far more alert to world issues, would occasionally in
a reflective mood manifest more of an appreciation for the
old peaceful days of Diazts reign.

An editorial in the

Catholi£ gerald typified this trend, as it recalled that
ttunder Diaz this one thing could be said - there was order,
if there was very little law".

9

The Month also echoed the

refrain that ftDiaz had been somewhat arbitrary in his rule,
but he had kept the country in tranquillity and growing
prosperity for over thirty years rt .10
6
7
8
9
10

Extensi on felt, though,

Dec. 24, 1910.
April 15, 1911.
April 29, 1911.
Catholic HeralQ, Sacramento, Oct. 10, 1914.
Month, London, June, 1916.

I

~06

.'

that Diaz had destroyed Democracy by suppressing the nationts
will which had once placed him in power, and consequently,
the Mexican people could find expression only in the ~Sword".~~

.....

The shock of the Mexican revolutions, however, was
felt around the

g~obe,

because of the immense amount of for-

eign capital invested in Mexican

resou~ces.

In the United

States the advocates of annexation were causing the murmur
of intervention to become audible.

America tried to convince

itself' that ttthese hazy and foolish dreams of conquest - if
they exist ••• are entertained by irresponsible individuals to
the exclusion of men in authoritytt. 12 By March, it was
a~armed

at these "irresponsible individuals", and the editor

was of' the belief that

al~

reasonable precautions should be

taken by our government in proper regard for our

nationa~

dignity to "prevent our citizens from burying themselves too
earnestly with the household affairs of our neighbor".

13

When the danger of United States' intervention aad
passed and

revo~utionary

of Diaz had .subsided, the

activity attendant on the resignation
~ ~aria

expressed its gratitude to

President Taft for
••• having done all in his power
to prevent a war. It is easy to
~~

12
13

Extension, Chicago, Feb.,
Jan. 7, ~91~.
March 18, ~911.

~915.

10?
see what might have happened in
the circumstances had the occupant of the White House been a
man of diffe ent training and
temperament. 14

;,..,

With the renewal of the war threat, the Sacred

B~s~~

Review,

however, became indignant at Hthe Yellow Journals that took
us into war against Cuba, and are
against Mexico".15

tryi~g

to engage us in war

And in November it continued the plea

for peace identified with this weekly, as its readers were
warned that if we fight Mexico, her divided factions will
unite against us, and concluded with the nation's desire for
peace:

tfThe Great Body of American people don't wantwar".16

The Catholic Telegraph, however, stated that it would not
comment on the trend of events, but that it would reprint a
few paragraphs from a critique of the situation in the Baltimore

~

for December 11, 1911.

In these, the

~

blamed

Washington for hatching the revolution as a means of forcing
Diaz into exile, and for permitting President Zelaya of
Nicaragua to escape to Mexico in a Mexican vessel. l ?
MADERO IN POWER

With the resignation of Diaz, all eyes were focus'ed
14
15
16
17

June 17, 1911.
Aug. 30, 1911.
Nov. 8, 1913.
Catholic Telegraph, Cincinnati, Dee. 14, 1911.

~

·'

on his successor.

~08

While America had grown unfriendly to

Diaz, from the very beginning it distrusted Madero:
But alasl Madero with the
Presidential bee in.ll,.'i.s bonnet
has furnished the occasion for
a fresh source of suspicion and
dissatisfaction against the
United States ••• His recent revolutionary spasm callei for a
larger outlay than he could afford ••• the money came from an
outside source. 18
Yet reason, not prejudice, guided America's Mexican policy;

.

the rational rather than the emotional element was preponderant in its editorials.

This was well exemplified in its edi-

torials full of grave doubts on the universal suffrage measures endorsed by Madero, which, generally speaking, received
such acclaim in the United States.

It felt that universal
,

suffrage at that time was "not prudent tl , for the Mexicans in
their intense patriotism are attracted by an "individual not the system he stands for".19

Hence some petty military

leader thus elected may dispel "all the roseate dreams of reform, liberty and popular government tt • 20
18

19
20

Amer i ca too, influ-

Dec. 24, 1910. In the June 17th issue, Ameri~§ printed
an editorial in which the Madero Government claimed the
revolution cost but $300,000. America's editor granted
the possibility of the claim, yet as it was shown in
Chapter I, America's suspicion was justified, and even
correct, if the Standard Oil Company was guilty of attempting to finance the Madero Revolution.
April 8, 1911.
April 15, 1911.

.'
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enced other periodicals; one of them was the Fortnightly

B£-

view, which also had little faith in the successful future
of the new Mexican leader.

For it, the new dictator was a

.

weak character and his rise to powe"ftv,as a mere accident.
"Viva Madero meant only down with Diaz, nothing more".

21

.

Yet strange to say, the following week, America,
a.fter a perusal of Madero's platform, changed its tone and
enthusiastically exclaimed that
If Madero, the triumphant
revolutionist, is indeed a
dreamer and an enthusiast, his
manifesto to his country is far
from showing it ••• There is nothing of the fanatic and fre~2
zied partisan in such advice.
After an overwhelming election made this man President, who
twel ve months previous was the leader of what seemed an impossible revolution, the Sacred Heart Review could not refrain from admiring him as "no ordinary mantt • 23
After his election, Madero struggled for two years
to effect his proposed reforms, but Mexican patience had its
limits, and the people's accustomed expression of political
•
dissatisfaction was uttered by a volley of guns. The Catholic

.'

papers gave only casual mention to Mexican political affairs.
21
22
23

~Qrtnightly Review, St. Louis, July 15, 1911.
July 22, 1911.
Nov. 18, 1911.
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.'

The overthrow of the Madero government failed to cause any
great stir, and even his murder provided editorial matter for
but a few.

The Sacred Heart Review, however, was evidently

.

moved and seriously doubted Huerta's·e~planation to Wilson
that Madero and Suarez were shot by their comrades in a rescue attempt. 24 A few years later the Extension also voiced

,

the opinion that Hit was a crime to murder them~.25
The Monitor of San Francisco, though, had acquired
evidence from another quarter and was convinced that
••• whatever the facts of the Mexican situation, one point is
clear, The Free Masons are determined to have the head of Huerta for his alleged killing of
Madero. But those who know say
Huerta is innocent. No matter
his doom ha~6been sealed in the
lodge room.
Since the world at large refused to let the incident die of
its own accord, the

Fortnightl~

Review in 1916, felt obliged

to print a defense of Huerta, testified to by a well known
Mexi can Bishop, who had personal contact wi th Huerta's cabinet.

This 'paper held emphatically that
Huerta at a cabinet meeting positively and vehemently refused to

24

25
26

March 1, 191.3.
Feb., 1915.
Monitor, San Francisco, Dec. 6, 1913.

.'
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listen to a proposal to kill Madero ••• After Huerta left, the
Cabinet decided on Madero' 6
death;
and it concluded with an

.

explanatory~ote:
...,

••• Huerta did not punish them,
because of a previous ungua2~ed
promise tto stand b~ them'.
The deep silence of the cat~olic press, generally
speaking, during the first years

o~

revolution, and especially

after Madero's death, gave rise to the insinuation that the
Church condemned the Revolutionist movement.

~ic~,

though,

saw the blessings in this adversity for "it sounded the alarm
for the C~itllolics to rise from the:ir lethargy of years tt • 28
In real amazement the Extel1sion wondered why the Church would
be anxious for the downfall of a man, who had given Mexico
some semblance of fair and honest elections and seemed to favor religious liberty.29

The Q,atholi,£ News claimed reliable

evidence that "the Catholic Church was entirely innocent of
intrigue against the unfortunate Madero". 30
Madero's death was to prQve no blessing for Huerta,
4

for it brought down on his head the opposition of the Washjngton Administration.
27
28
29
30

This stand was going to serve as the

June 15, 1916.
Aug. 16, 1916.
May, 1915.
~olic l!~,

New York, March 4:, 1916.

...

,

112

springboard for the attack of the Catholic press in the coming years.

Among the first of the weeklies which strove to

convince Wilson of' his error was America.
As far back as May,
,
1913, it warned that

"~

failure to recognize the Huerta Gov-

ernment will leaq. inevitably to American intervention'" .,31
Again it rose to Huerta's defense in

~swer

to the serious

charges hurled against him by the non-sectarian and Protestant presses:
Huerta's program is the only
saving and reasonable one ••• The
picture of Huerta is most reassuping. He seems to be the man of
the hour and is far from the bloodthirsty usurper that he is presented to be by n§~ wholly disinterested parties. '
~VILSON

'S SF ECIAL AGENTS

In Washington, Wilson replied to the cry for action,
as we have seen, by sending a personal representative to Mex- icoe

The silence of the Catholic press on William Bayard

Hale's mission was broken by the Catholic Mind in an article,
which proved to be a perfect mirroring of Catholic opinion.
It contented itself in calling him
••• a preacher of unenviable notoriety, who flitted through the
country, associated with Masonry
and priesthaters and having re31
32

May 31, 1913.
Aug. 16, 1913.

--------------------.......
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ported to Washington, boasted in
a published article that he has
decided Wilson against Huerta- _.
which accusation was never denied. 33
' .

.....

Hale's mission also resulted in the recall of the Mexican Ambassador,

H.

L. Wilson.

While it did not commit itself' either

way on the President's action,

. in fairness rep orted

~.r..i_~

that the Ambassador in his appearance before the Senate investigation Committee had completely won over a prejudiced Senate. 34
The next step of the Washington Administration was
not less unpopular:
tial agent of Wilson.

John Lind was apPointed the new confidenIn a most unconvincing manner .a!!!..§l:ill

added that "it based hope on the Lind mission n •

35

The Catholic

press reaction was delayed, as was usual on the whole Mexican
question.

Then, late in 1914, the Catholic

M1~

in a fiery

article was indignant at Lind's partisanship and breach of
faith in siding the Constitutionalists with smuggled arms, as
was proved by a series of editorials in the New York Herald
Tribq.n-.-!!_ 36 •The very same charge was rei tera ted by

Ameri~,~

and it further demanded that Ifsomebody must speak·t in Washing33

34
35
36

Oct., 1914.

Aug. 9, 1913.

,Aug. 16, 1913.
Feb. 1914.

,

.'
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ton to explain such acti.on by one of its officials.

37

The

ExtensiQB. considered him a "bigoted representative tl for his
ac.quiescence and even encouragement of "exiling and murdering of nuns".38

As the months passe~~the voice of this same

periodical grew louder and sharper; in a year's time Lind
was the target of some truly cutting

s~rcasm:

As long as he kept his mouth
closed we surmised that there was
much wisdom hidden somewhere in
his head •••when Mr. Lind opened
his mouth to speak, he revealed
the vacuity concealed in the
sphinxlike solidity of his head.
We have queer ambassadors these
days.39
While the criticism of the Catholic

~

was more dignified,

it was not less sharp in describing Lind as "cutting a sorry
picture tt • 40 In the estimation of the Brooklyn Tablet, all
of Wilson's foreign troubles were due to the incompetency of
his so-called diplomats. 41
Lind's mission ended in complete failure, when in
October 1914, the dictator defied Washington's demand for a
democratic election.
•

The

m

Maris; sensed that the President's

pride had been injured and so it pleaded "on the part of wi~37
38
39
40
41

July
Nov.
Feb.
July

4, 1914.
14, 1914.
1915.
2, 1915.

~~00k1I£ ~~,

Brooklyn, New York, Dec. 18, 1915.

~15

dom ••• to heed the warning against intervention in Mex.ico tt •
In a brief editorial the

Catholj~

of President Wilson's previous

42

Telegra£h voiced approval

... to

effort~
;,

avoid war and warned

the ttJingoes" that the horrors, destruction and cost of war
should give them pause before urging intervention, and urged
them instead to support the President'. humane policy.

43

The President, however, al tared some of th'e humane
aspects of his policy, when he lifted the Arms Embargo in
February 1914.
then, the

Disapproval took a year to reach print, and

ill Maria accused our government of prolonging the

reign of terror by lifting the Embargo.
~

44

When the Qatholic

protested, it was far stronger, because in early 1916,

the United States seemed unable to avoid a Mexican war:
This murderer Villa, it may be
worthwhile remembering, is the man
who with Carranza, in the early
days of the uprising against Huerta
was aided by Wilson's watchful
waiting policy that allow~g ~
and ammuni11Qu to be shipped from
the United States. No doubt the
verx guns which his followers ~h2]
~ Americans with last Monday were
those the Wilson Policy 2ermitted
Vi1lg ~Q ~ecure.4~
42
43
44

45

Nov. 21, 1913.
Jan. 14, 1914.
June 10, 1915.
June 15, 1916.
thesis wri tar.

The underlined words are those of the

}16

WAR CLOUDS APPEAR
The Embargo, however, did attract more attention to
\filson' s policy, which the Fortnightly
as "that of watchful drift".46

Then:

R~view

~he

characterized

Tampico incident

occurred, which resulted in further changes in policy and the
sending of troops to seize Vera Cruz • •The

con~rete

reality

of war, blood and death, gave the Catholic press the sadly
needed jolt required to wake it up.

With one hundred per

cent support of our Government's action, the qatholl£

~

graph decl.ared that there was no other course but to appl.y
force, and it was sure that "Mexico will come to understand
that our action is a blessing in disguise ••• and based on fraternal solicitude ••• We support Wilson's diplomacy".47
~qlic N~

The

also breathed deeply of the patriotic air and

exhaled denunciation of Huerta's refusal to salute the flag
as tthumiliating to the United States tt ; then, in purest simpli~ity

went on to boast that the first public utterance in

aupport of the President has come from the Catholic Club of
New York CitJy, and it concluded with whole hearted su.pport
of the President's effort "to maintain the dignity and honor
of our beloved country".48
46 April 15, 1914.
47 April 23, 1914.
48 April 23, 1914.

It was a most reluctant editor of

117
the Baltimore Catholic Review that joined in the flag waving
as he informed his readers that patriotism demands support of

.

the President, yet "we hope that further bloodshed will be
.
49
tt
avoided •
That this editorial was inspired by a sense of

.....

duty to the country became evident after one read another editorial on the same page, which stated

~at

"the right to in-

tervene in Mexico ••• does not seem to be ours".50
Brooklyn

~ablet

In turn, the

confined itself to pointing out some aspects

of Catholic patriotism. 51

The real high note in Wilson laud-

ation, though, was sung by the editor of the
in commemoration

0

Qstho~ic ~

f the eighteen blue jackets who gave their

1ifes' blood at Vera Cruz:
President Wilson has made an
address that has thrilled the nation ••• It was the first step in
the achievement of that noble aim
that these yg~g men honored fell
last Monday. .

....

An action, nevertheless, that might have meant war,
was a sure source of irritation to a few such as the Sacree
Hear~ Revie~,

who were among the chief advocates of peace.

regretted that the Washington Administration "did not

keep.~ts

temper a little longer", and then it indulged in sarcasm:
49
50
51

52

May
May
May
May

2, 1914.
2, 1914.
16, 1914.
16, 1914.

It
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The resolution of Congress disclaims all hostility to the Mexican
people; but a shell from a ten inch
gun does not $top to differentiate
between a number of th~ Mexican 53
people and a follower.~ Huerta.
While the Western Catholic limited itself tlto hoping and praying for peace tt , 54
for

~ugar-coating

,.

the Michigan Catholic perceived no reason
the truth:

Wart The ominous word has gone forth
and some of our brave lads have already
given their magnificent youths for what? Few of us really know, while
most of us resset Admiral Mayo' s unwise haste •••
By

~9l6,

the Brooklyn !ablet felt the same, as it pOinted back

to Vera Cruz "as Mr. ~Vilson' s Water~oof1. 56
Mr. Wilson would have discovered Vera Cruz to be his
Waterloo long before 1916, if he had not been saved from a
Mexican war by the timely intervention of Argentina, Brazil
and Chile to arbitrate the two nations' difficulties.

With

this offer the Sacr~ Heart Revi~ revived its peace hopes;57
while the Catholic R!!!S8 and Fortnight~~ Review 59 rejoiced
that a war had been averted.
53 April 25, 1914.
54 !,!stern Catholic,Quincy, Ill., May 8, 1914.
55 Michig§n ,Qatholic, Detroit, April 30, 1914.
56 July 1, 1916.
57 May 2, 1914.
58 May 2, 1914.
59 May 15, 1914.
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Although the war threat had given place to peace
hopes, the Catholic press, henceforth, became keenly interested in the Mexican question.

Wilson's policy was now a

....

common editorial topic; a subject of the most loyal defenses
and the sharpest attacks.
fenders were few.

After May 1914, however, the de-

It surprised nobody,. to find the Sacred

Heart Review complaining that the punishment of Huerta for
his refusal to salute the flag had been superseded by a socalled war of service. 60 For the Fortnightly Revie~ the Mexican horizon was brighter, yet it still doubted the wisdom of
much of Wilson's policy.61

As for America, it could see ab-

solutely no reason to compliment the
•••Presiden t for his a tti tude
towards Mexico, which has been
a puzzle to the country at
large. From the very beginning
his friends and foes alike have
been dissatisfied with his
sphinx-like reticence •••Neither
equity nor law justified the
62
sending of our army into Mexico.
The President's puzzling policy stirred up only more
disfavor,

w~en

it proved powerless to curtail Vibla's crimes.

In exasperation the Brooklyn Tablet hoped that the protests
from the British and French Governments would cause Wilson to
60 June 13, 1914.
61 June 7, 1914.
62 June 6, 1914.

.'
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realize that more definite action must be taken to preserve
life and property in Mexico. 63 A warning, th ough', was ~
icat~

message in its all too true prediction that Wilson, in

receiving Carranza delegates, and in·;ssuring them of sincere
friendship, was going to find himself "in an extremely embarrassing position before long"; 64 while. two weeks later it lamented that the Washington authorities have put themselves in
such an awkward diplomatic position by "playing the part of
the protecting aegis" to a rascally horde commanded by Villa.

65

These same outrages also were too much for the patient Indiana

Q~lic,

which wished to arouse other papers to protest

against the Wilson Administration for its responsibility in
66
placing the Constitutionalist in power.
The opposite view,
though, was still held by the Catholic

~elegraph,

Democrat in

sympathy, which still believed that the moral influence of
Wilson's policy in union wi th the ABC mediators would compel
the Constitutionalist to show some justice to the Church. 67
If Wilson's effort to help Mexico in the fall of
1913 was the index of the Catholic press influence, it would
•
have been a miserable failure. Yet this did not discourage
63
64
65
66
67

July 25, 1914.
Aug. 1, 1914.
Aug. 15, 1914.
Indiau~ £atho1i~,

July 30, 1914.

Indianapolis, Aug. 15, 1914.

ow.
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the papers from continuing to remind Washington of its duty.
The Catholic

~graph

by September, 1914, was gradually los-

ing its confidence in the panacea of Wilson's policy, so that
,

it called upon the American Federatlo~ of Catholic Societies
"to utilize its influence to the utmost to obtain effective
action from Washington M• 68 To the Monitor, it seemed a coni

tradiction that America prays for peace for a war torn Europe,
while at the same time "she grasps in friendship the bloody
hand that harasses the :Mexican people n • 69 The Fortnight1I'
Review pointed the accusing finger at our Government as being
responsible for the Carranza outrages, which followed on the
heels of Huerta's removal from power.?O

A completely differ-

ent aspect, however, was considered by the Extension, which
shifted the blame from President Wilson to "ourselves", because our government is a representative organization. 71
PRESS PROTESTS INCREASE
As long as Woodrow Wilson preferred to overlook the
atrocities committed by the followers of Villa and Carranza,
his favor with the Catholic press continued to wane.
"

Even the

Canadian Catholics were disgusted with the President's fa:t:J..ure
68
69
70
71

Sept. 24, 1914.
Oct. 17, 1914.
Oct. 15, 1914.
Nov., 1914.

,
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to act.

But one of their papers, the Catholic Record, became

more annoyed with the passivity of the Catholic papers in the
United States than with the President:
But so far wi th t'h~ exception of America and the protests
of the Federation o~ Catholic Societies, and the feeble bleats
from a few newspapers we have
heard nothing. Perhaps,·they
don't wish ••• to embarrass the
government or are too persistent
in devQtion to Job, their patron
saint. 72
The following week a few more papers, perhaps stirred by the
challenge, expressed their sentiments.

Disgust colored the

Boston Pilotts comment on our government's absolute

indi~~er-

ence to the most brutal outrages taking place at our very
door. 73

In this observation the BrooklYl! Tablet, in contrast

to the Catholic Record's charge, concluded that "the Catholic
newspapers of the country seem pretty unanimously to have come
to the conclusion ••• that the time has come ••• to voice protest
to the Administration in washington u • 74 While out West, the
voice of the Intermountain Catholic was heard complaining, be•

.'

cause those in Washington failed to take notice that Catholic
Americans were demanding protection of their co-religionists in
72
73
74

Catholic Record, London, Canada, Nov. 1, 1914.
Boston Pilot, Boston, Nov. 12, 1914.
Nov. 21, 1914.

·,123

Mexico. 75

The Newark Monitor, in its turn, attributed the

source and continuance of Mexican anarchy to Mexican Masons
76 The reply of the
rather than to Washington pOliticians.

.....

~.

~~ulletin,

however, asked why the papers were so si-

lent, when reliable evidence had been offered to ,prove that
priests were being murdered and nuns +avished by Villa and
Carranza bands1 77 America, though, encouraged its readers
with an optimistic forecast baaed on Secretary of State Bryan's promise that
••• when the time arrives for
recognition the Department of
State assures you that the
question of religious freedom
in Mexico wil1 eceive due
consideration. 7S
After the President's annual message to Congress in ,....
December, 1914, the country's attention was again drawn to
his foreign policy, for in this address he failed to mention
the Mexican situation.

Many of the Catholic papers began to

doubt the President's sincerity.

Just previous to the address,

the Brooklyn Tablet let it be known that all were most anxious
•
79
This inexcusable'
to know the President's foreign plans.
omission was immediately made the theme of the none too
75
76
77
78
79

Interm2.!mtain £atholi£" Salt
N'ewarl} li1onitor, .Newark, l'Iov.
~. ~ By11etin, St. Paul,
Dec. 5, 1914. (This promise
Dec. 5, 1914.

Lake City, Nov. 12, 1914.
15, 1914.
Nov. 11, 1914.
was never kept).

j
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friendly Sacred Heart Review's next editorialt
Treating of our foreign p 01icy the President says: "We are
at peace with the world" ••• Mr.
,Wilson may congratul~~. himself
and pat himself on the back •• ~but
this country represented is directly responsible for all the
crimes •••. in Mexico, and the memory of them like the gGPst of
Banquo, will not down; it wil1 80
not be hidden by fine phrases.
The President also received a quiet reminder from America
that when we entered Mexico there was at least some semblance
of law, but when we left i t t here was nothing but chaos. 8l
Even the faithful Catholic. I.!legrB:l2h was al ienated from the
President:
••• before God and the world Mr.
Wilson is rigntly held responsible for the regime in Mexico.
While pursuing a course of
'watchful waiting' we earnestly
hope that we will not be co~2pelled to wait much longer.
Nor could the

Denv~ B~ister

interpret the message in any

other light than that the Administration was trying to take
refuge behind the excuse of non-interference.

The editor

then demanded that the Administration adopt immediate measures
to undo the evil already perpetrated, or accept full responsi80
81

82

Dec. 12, 1914.
Dec. 12, 1914.
Dec. 10, 1914.

.' ~25

bility for the crimes of the Constitutionalists.

83

EVALUATION OF HUERTA
During the troubled days ?f 1914, however, Wilson
was not the only personage connected with the Mexican story.
There were also three leading Mexicans featured in the- crramatis Eersonae: Huerta, Villa and

Ca~anza.

The leading role

was assumed by the dictator, Huerta, in the tragedy of his
own fall from power.

While our Administration was expending

great effort to secure a change in the Mexican Government,
the

Extensi~n

suggested that it would do better if it spent

more time asking itself ttafter Huerta - What, instead of
after Huerta - Who".84

The Sacred Heart Review, while far

more sympathetic to Huerta than Wilson, nevertheless, was irritated at the narrow minded, rather than rational,
written by some of
••• the esteemed Catholic correspondents, who h ave found reason
for Wilson's opposition to Huerta ••• because he is a Catholic
••• and his tacit approval of
Carranza ••• because he is antiCatholic. Let us have some common sense in our comments on the
President and his attitudes
toward Huerta. His statesmanship may be at fault ••• He may
have the Mexican bull by the
83
84

Denv~r~egister,

Feb., 1914.

Denver, Dec. 26, 1914.

editorial~
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wrong horns; but he deserves better than to have SUS~!cions cast
upon his good faith.

.'

Our Government's treatment of Huerta during the
Tampico incident served to tighten tllt bonds of friendship already existing between Huerta and several of the Catholic
weeklies.

Wilson was rubbing a sore siot in h is unjustified

opposition to Huerta.

In the mind of the

Brookl~n

Tablet Hu-

erta was no worse than those Mexican officials whom we were
befriending.

Therefore, the Administration should clean up
Mexico thoroughly or allow Huerta to rule. 86 In the eyes of
America, the Tampico incident boomeranged on the President,
for
Our Government has refused
to recognize Huerta ••• yet a nation was asked to make reparation through its chief officer.
Here is recognition ••• Such a dilemma is e~~arrassing for the
President.
The Baltimore Catholic Beviey judged it only fair to keep in
mind Huerta's courtesy towards the United States, in spite of
naIl the rio.iculous fuss ••• caused by that little ttempest in
the teapott - the Tampico incident".88
85
86
87
88

March 28, 1914.
April 25, 1914.
April 25, 1914.
Catholic Review, Baltimore, Aug. ~,19l4. Henceforth,
only the title Catholic Eeview will be used.

-
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Huerta's resignation found the majority of the
Catholic papers also unable to join in the universal joy of
the

secu~r

and Protestant press.

The Cath21!£

Bevie~

did

not hesitate to throw the damp rag an~such rejoicing by the
reminder that the flight of Huerta was not the end of Mex-

.

ico's trouble, but only an introduction to a worse state of
existence under the government of Carranza and Villa. 89 In
an issue a month later, it appealed to the President's sense
of fair play by asking him to go before the people and "admit his mistake".90
Although its effort reaped no fruit, the Catholic
press continued to defend Huerta in the hope of eventually
convincing the President of his mistaken policy.

To the

Columbiad, it seemed that the Catholic press was failing to
influence Washington because a greater power, the Masons,
was interfering with any attempts to secure Huerta's recognition by Wilson. 9l This opinion, too, was held by the Catholic
Mind. 92

In the opinion of the Sacre~ Heart Review, Huerta was

no worse t~an the men whom our government favored;93 while the
89 Aug. 1, 1914.
90 Sept. 9, 1914.
91 Co~umbiad, New Haven, Oct., 1914.
92 Oct. 1914.
93 Nov. 14, 1914.
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Catholic Standard

~

Times was disgusted with the Administra94

tion's support of two "ex-bandi ts of the most repulsive type tt •

..

A positive approach, though, was adopted by Michigan Catholic,
.,

which quoted our diplomat, Nelson O'Shaughnessey, as saying
that "Huerta has been grossly vilified by the press of the
United States ••• He is not the drunkard.he is made to appear".
Even from across the sea Huerta was recognized

E,S

95

Mexico's man

of the hour, who had been rejeeted. 96
Huerta, however, was not considered the Mexican
panacea by all Catholics.

There were exceptions.

With much

delight would Wilson have read the Catholic li2.!:thwes,t

~rogre.§.§.,

which confirmed his policy:
There are some who think that
Huerta was a devout Catholic and
the protagonist of the Catholics
of Mexico. Nothing could be
farther from the truth. The United
S~at9' did right in not recognizing

~

h~m.

The General was also soundly spanked by the pro-Wilsonian half
of the sometimes divided Catholic Review's editorial staff,
which
94
95
96
97

spoke~of

him as

Catholic Standard ~ 1ime.§" Philadelphia, Dec. 19, 1914.
Nov. 21, 1914.
Month, Jan. 1915.
Catholic Northwest Progress, Seattle, Oct. 31, 1914.

,
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••• scoundrel, unworthy of the position he has usurped, full of
savage instincts which he lets
loose, and condemned by the President of the United ~sates, Huerta
must be eliminated. .'<

.....

While the Fortnightly Review opposed Carranza, it challenged
the pro-Huerta papers to offer proof that the former dictator

,.

would have established a permanent peace, if they were going
to make such statements. 99 The dispute that followed added
nothing of note to what was already known. IOO Both the
and the Month, however, strongly held that Huerta was "a just and competent ru1er tt101 and "would have
brought order to Mexico ft • 102

Qathol~£ ~,

VILLA, THE BANDIT
Huerta also sh ared the newspaper headline s during
1914 with the second lead in the Mexican tragedy:

Villa, Ita
bandit without conscience, a bloody murderer for hire tt • 103
Like two weights poised on a balance, he rose when Huerta fell.
Strange to say, the reputedly clever Wilson was grooming this
reprobate to take over the reins of government.

This was too

much for the Catholic Hind, which held that this likely co.-

--,---98
99
100
101
102
103

July 4, 1914.
April 15, 1916.
May 11, 1916; June 1, 1916.
Jane, 1916.
July 22, 1916.
Americ~, Mar. 13, 1913.
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testant for supreme authority was an Ifignorant illiterate, a
bandit and a murderer".104

If Wilson was really going to

shake hands with Villa, America thought it should be called
to the attention of our Government

t~t

a violent anarchist

recently arrested in Spain had letters on his person, which
proved he had been. in frequent communication with the Mexican
105
rebels.

•

What really worried the Catholic press, though, was
the prospect of United States' recognition of Villa.
alarm was sounded by the Catholic

The

N~:

A government ••• with Villa as
a dominating influence could not
logically be recognized by the
United States. Mr. Wilson, to be
consistent with himself, could
not shake hands wi th one who indulges in murder by wholesale.
The future of Mexican Constitutionalism demands the elimination
of Villa in a political quantity. 106

On the same day, too, the Baltimore Catholic Review sounded
lO
the same alarm. ? There were no bouquets for President Wilson for wise diplomacy either by the Catpolic Bulletin, which

.

frankly acknowledged that the United States knowingly or unknowingly, has allowed itself to be placed in a position of
104
105
106
10?

June, 191.4.
June 6, 1914.
July 4, 1914.
July 4,1914 •.

I

.'

131

abetting "the so-called Constitutionalists in their unholy war
of rapine, murder and especially of aiding the cut-throat like

Villa~.108 At the moment when Villa's star seemed to be setting over the White House, the Catholic Pkeview's former meek
disagreement gave way to a terrified scream. lOS
The mention

0

f Villa immedtt.. tely bro ught up the as-

sociations of Carranza and the Constitutionalist cause.

Thus

Carranza was assigned a minor supporting role by the Catholic
press during 1914.

Yet his connection with the Constitution-

alists would prepare his way for prominence in the coming
years.

At that time the Constitutionalists' outrages seemed

to be leading to intervention.

The M5U:ning

~

such things be tolerated under the protection
flag?"110

0

asked:

ttShall

f the American

And when American Catholics became the subject of ...

ridicule for their defense of the persecuted Mexicans, the
Catholic

li!~

minced no words in informing the abusers that

"since the Government of this country aided the Constitutiona1ist to gain the upper hand ••• It ought to interfere to prevent such barbarity as is practiced there today. I I I
OPPOSITION TO WILSON
Villa and Carranza might be the immediate instru108

109
110
111

July 18, 1914.
Aug. 22, 1914.
Morning §~, New Orleans, Sept. 19, 1914.
Oct. 24, 1914.

.'
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ments causing all this chaos, but many felt as the Montp did,
th2.;t the President's apathy had furnished the moral encouragement and the material means of innumerable and unspeakable
brutalities. 112 • This editorial ser;e£ as an introduction and
index of what the Catholic press had in store for the Presiden t during the coming year

0

f 1915.

rrequently he was going

to find himself embarrassed by editorials like those
~ightly

0

f the

Review which asked him what he was doing to pre-

vent the outrages in

~irexico;

or why had he broken his promise

made through Secretary Bryan to make religious freedom a
prime consideration in extending recognition to Mexico~l13
The London Catholic Month thought the only so lution the President could offer would be intervention, and it proceeded to
justify such an action on grounds quite novel to pagan
America:
••• It is a delicate matter for a
British Journal in present circumstances to criticize any detail of
the American Administration, but
we are sure that those in the
States feel as we do ••• While there
was a prospect of restoring order
in r,!exico under the strong rule of
Huerta, President Wilson brought
pressure to have him dismissed and
succeeded ••• Yet now the President
112
113

Jan. 1915.
Jan. 1, 1915.

.'
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wants to give them ~reedom in
their own a~£airs •••Wilson
stands by and asks - Am I my
brother's keeper? Just as the
individual is bound to give
help to the neighbor .UlJ.justly
attacked, so the Sta~e~must
succour a neighbor state
plunged in disorder which it
cannot itsel~ remedy. The
Christian Doctrine on the subject was plainly decla~d by
Pope Pius IX in 1860 when in
the Encyclical Novos ~! ~
he condemned the prii4iple of
ttNoJl-Intervention tt •
While this barrage of accusations was laid down,
one of the good words spoken for the President presented an
interesting aside.

During this period of Catholic discon-

tentment with existing Mexican policies, a malicious rumor
spread rapidly and far that Wilson had insulted Cardinal
Gibbons at an interview.
o~ficial

The Baltimore Catholig

fievi~,

the

organ for Cardinal Gibbons, which always strove to

keep the Catholic Mexican protest not only on a factual, but
also a fair basis, gave front page prominence to the refutation of the charge of Wilson's disrespect.

The article mere-

4

ly recorded an interview with Monsignor Russell, who accom;:
panied the Cardinal to the VlThi te Ho'use:
I (Monsignor Russell) can
say if the President addressed
the Cardinal as "Mr. It . . . . For I
114

Feb., 1915.

,

,
.'
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was not more than two feet from
the President during the whole
interview ••• and I did not hear
him. 115

.

Just to prove its fairness, it allaw'id the pro-Wilsonian editor to write an editorial soon afterwards, which quoted the
words of Cardinal Gibbons that ttarme<\, intervention must never
take place.

We who have the interest of the country at

heart approve of the present Administrationts cours~n.116
The Catholic World, however, preferred to face the
cold facts, and it told the President he must either intervene or remain out altogether and leave Mexico to the Hexicans. ll? The President was also reminded by the ~atholic
~

that it was no mere platitude that "no democracy can ex-

ist which to satisfy the tyrannical injustices of 2 per cent
of its population, tramples on the dearest rights of 98 per
cent as is being done in Mexico n • llB Yet it seemed to the
Brooklyn Tablet that the President was too timorous and wavering in his Mexican pOlicy.119
CARRANZA CONDE1.mED

•
..'
The spotlight for 1915, though, Was chiefly focused

115
116
II?
118
119

Mar. 6, 1915.
Mar. 29, 1915.
March, 1915.
May 11, 1915.
May 22, 1915.

•
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on Carranza, not Woodrow Wilson.
foothold, he rose swiftly.

Once Carranza gained a

His rapid rise to power and the

.-

eventual headaches to the Washington authorities found no
cause for sympathetic response from the

~4tholic ~,

be-

cause our Government had been responsible for his being in
authori ty. 120

Ap1eric~ sketched Carra~za as an "intolerant

demagogue wedded to a blind tyranny, which will always find
expression in acts of oppressive violence and vindictiveness".121

To the ~ooklyn T~blet it seemed a thing of wonder-

ment how the Constitutionalists could perform actions far
more insulting to our flag, to human justice and decency than
Huerta ever dreamed of committing, and yet have our govern122
ment justify such behaviour1
The Carranza opposi ti on truly grew in volume, when
indications in Washington turned towards Carranza's recognition.

Immediately the Mexican question was treated with

graver concern in t he editorials of the Catholic press.

In

mid May the Catholic Review decisively protested against such
-t'
123 In its turn, the Extension, edited by the
recogn~ ~ont
now famous Bishop Kelley, tried to drive home to the Govern120
121
122
123

Feb. 20, 1915.
Mar. 10, 1915.
April 10, 1915.
May 15, 1915.

....
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ment the importance of such a step:
It is perfectly true that the
American Government is the protector of Mexico; and that no other
government i~ the wor~d~will act
on the questlon of recognizing Mexico until Washington acts ••• The
pledge of the Government on the
question of religious liberty is a
pledge that can be kept.,.It is a
pledge that must enter i~2~ the
question of recognition.
In early October, the Catholics' hopes began to
change further, not to gold like the early autumn leaf, but
rather to a November withered brown, when Secretary Lansing
and the representatives of the South American Republics
seemed agreed on Carranza as Mexico's presidential choice.
When this report reached America's editor, he made no effort
to aoften his sharp admonition to Washington that such recognition would be against the principle of international law
.

and in discord with the standard set by the Unlted States.

125

While the editorial of the Catholic Review breathed disappoint-

,

ment, yet it concluded with a half-hearted, flickering hope
that "the
a choice".

Pr~sident'
~6

s judgment would not bind to so ignoble

The Brooklyn Tablet, however, spoke forth-

~

rightly as it summed up the hard truth that
124
125
126

June, 1915.
Oct. 2, 1915.
Oct. 9, 1915.

III,
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••• there is no dodging it, if the
President recognizes the Carranza
Administration, the only interpretation possible is that he
openly ignores the wishes of sixteen million Catholic .<>i tizens
and repudiates the promises made
by the State Department last December ••• and has forgotten the
~rinciplel~~ which our government
loS based.
In its next issue the headlines flared:

•

Carranza Recognition Will Be Open
Insult 1~8Catholics in the United
States.
According to the conservative Catholic
'
Carranza t s
ques t loon

C h'
O1.ce

~

one could only

.
Huer t a. 129
over t h e superl.or

On October 19, 1915, the recognition was a fact, but

it was not so easily digested by the Catholic papers.
then that bitterness crept into the Catholic

~'

It was

comment,

because Carranzats guarantees were more highly regarded in
Washington than the word of responsible American citizens.

130

Both the Catholic T~legra~h131 and the Sacred H~ E§view132
attributed this shameful recognition to the efforts of a group
of powerful and influential Carranza backers in Vlash ington •
127
128
129
130
131
132

Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
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Yet in a less polemical, but possibly more devastating attack,
the Wholic World wounded deeply all of the Wilson advocates
among its readers by the simple

....

remar~

that after Carranza's

recognition people had good cause to be disappointed in an
133
idealist, who had abandoned his fundamental principle.
While in the mind of the editor of the

~

Maria, the recog-

nition resolved the President's action into an embarrassing
dilemma:

!tIf President Wilson is informed about what Carranza.

has done in Mexico, his action is unaccountable.

If he is not

informed, his ignorance is without the least foundation~.134
Perhaps, though, the strongest criticism of Wilson's latest
diplomatic venture was expressed in the Michigan Catholic:

•

The Chief Executive made a
grave mistake in recognizing Carranza. The United States has no
right to foist a government on
the Mexican people, and I assert
there is no evidenc e t ha t the Mexican people want Carranza.
In the recognition •••Mr. Wilson is setting up in Mexico a government which does not derive its
power 'from the consent of the
governed' but from the consent of
Mr. Wilson.
He acted contrary to the
spirit of our institution and the
well grounded conviction of our
people. And he is giving the support of his high office and name

_ _ _ _
0 _ _

133
134

Catholic World, New York, Nov., 1915.
Nov. 7, 1915.

...
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to a principle which now our
Congress is positively forbidden
to embody in Law •
••• We clearly await the day
of election and in an orderly
way recordl~gr disapir~bation at
the polls.
Although Carranzats recognition was universally opposed by the Catholic press,

neverthe~ss,

a few of the week-

lies deemed it the duty of good Catholics to submit to authority.

The Qstholic Review was among the first to accept the

new decision and like an obedient son stepped in line:

~fe

no longer kick ••• We obey the will of our Chief Magistrate";

136

and it reiterated this message the following week in a
stronger refrain:
It becomes our duty to acquiesce, to be submissive. We do
not think the decision is wise.
It is manifestly, though, not for
us to berate and blackguard our
President and his advisers for
this decision ••• It is ours now to
work with the President~d help
. for the best in Mexico.
Although the For~qightlY Review
ian

139

138

and the Little Rock Guard-

refused to acquiesce in the recognition, nevertheless,
",

they thought it unfair to blame the Wilsonians entirely for
this move, which was endorsed by several supposedly Catholic
135
136
137
138
139

NOVe
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Oct. 16, 1915.
Oct. 23, 1915.
N"ov. 15,1915.
Guardian, Little

Vol. 5

.'
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nations of South America, and our representatives.
TUMULTY SCHEME
With the Presidential election soon coming up,
Woodrow 'Nilson became alarmed at the· ~owing hostility of the
Catholic citizenry_

His justified anxiety gave hirth to a

scheme that sadly backfired on its preiidential inventor.
The instrument used:

The retiring Mr.

T~~ulty,

the Presi-

dent's priyate secretary; the kernel of the scheme:

Mr. Tu-

multy's letter to his obligingly inquisitive friend, in which
the whole Mexican persecution is explained away as an overexaggeration.

The whole stupid plot was exposed in a few

sentences by the Brooklyn Tablet:
We are not surprised at the
action of Mr. Tumulty in trying
to whitewash the President in his
attitude towards Mexico and outraged nuns ••• Already he sees •••
the Catholic vote threatening his
future ambitions. He must prepare to square himself with the
Catholic population of the country. Who is a better tool than
his secretary? The isolated
Catholic in the White House haa
succumbed to the weight of the
white-necktied category. The
bolt has been shot, not by the
Presbyterian President, b~40by
the Catholic man, Friday.

..

."

The Catholic News, too, read between the lines of Tumulty's

--,----140

Dec. 1, 1915.

141
letter and drew the same conclusion. 14l

Since it put on its

rose colored glasses, as was customary when reading a Wils,onian document, the

~h.gliq

Revie!! found some justifica-

tion for Tumulty's cause, but thought~t unwise of the Secretary to try to knock the foundation from the Catholic criti-

.

cism by declaring his case rested on proven facts.

142

While

the CatholjQ Transcrigt, thundered out against such "small
•
t 143
.
1y Rev~ew
. 144
and unstatesmanlike tact~cs',
the Fortn~ght
and the EXlll1si..9..n145 predicted that this campaign document
would cost him votes at the polls.
After the Tumulty schemes had died an unhappy
death, the President learned from this experience that the
Catholic press did have a strong voice, when raised in protest.

He consequently decided it would be better to let

events follow a more natural course.

The Catholic

[~

....
grew

more annoyed with President Wilson's ttamazing complacency" in
treating the Mexican situation. 146 The Church P~ogress also
warned the President that he would have to answer for the
147
further per~ecution of the Church in Mexico.
Again the
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Dec. 4, 1915.
Dec. 18, 1915.
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cry of intervention tra.velled across the sea, as the Month
called the President to task in dogmatic English 'phraseology:
I

It is quite unintelligible to
the Americans how theix President
could be impelled to·recognize
Carranza •••
We can understand the reluctance of Mr. Wilson to intervene in
the affairs of a neigh~oring country. But surely there are limits
to the principle of non-intervention, and those limits are reached
when a neighboring state 1 ike the
United States refuses to act
though with abundant means to compel the submission of a few anarchists who are oppref4~g the
country by violence.
There was another source of opposition to the Carranza recognition, and that was not the pens of editors, but
the bullets of a bandit, the bullets of a slighted Villa.

It

was the srune Villa, who seemed to be forcing the Administration to fulfill the P4,qnth's desire of intervention.

.-

Without

even seeking a pretext, Villa began taking the lives of American citizens.

To add fuel to the fire, Carranza encouraged

the war trend, when according to the

~.2.li..£ ~

!the

blocked the~ President's efforts to catch Villa tf ;149 and bJ"
April, it accused Carranza of openly aiding Villa to escape.
After Villa's raids made it patent to all that Wilson's
-----~

148
149

150

Jan., 1916.
Jan. 24, 1916.
April 29, 1916.

150

,
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.'

"placation of Carranza" policy was a complete fiasco, the i l l
Maria quoted a scorching condemnation of it by Cardinal Gibbons, who no longer restrained himself by any over-patriotic
defense of the Administration:

......

The ultimate destruction of
all authority in Mexico is the
logical result of the policy of
the present Administrat~n from
its very inception: Only partisans or those who are hopeless
blockheads Vlill gainsay this;
and it should be borne in mind.
How unlikely the deplorable
conditions of Mexico is to improve
under Carranza is plain from his
acts ••• He is a wily rascal. intervention will come in the end. 51
The Fortnightly Review, however, was skeptical
whether the interests of the United states would be secured by
intervention;152 yet the Catholic ~ demanded some change in
tactics because of the miserable failure of the present policy.153

Caution, though, was advised by the Ave Marig, due to
hero worship of Villa by his considerable following. 154
During this crisis in the first half of 1916, one
paper, the Brooklyn Tablet, deserves a special mention for the
keen interest shown, and the sharper criticism expressed,
151
152
153
154

Jan. 29, 1916.
March 25, 1916.
April 15, 1916.
May 13, 1916.

.
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on the Mexican situation.

In early January, intervention was

the theme running through its editorials. Carranza's insol155
ence should not go unpunished;
a week later Villa's murder
of sixteen Americans would certainlt torce Wilson to abandon
"
' muc h r~d~culed
h ~s
watc hf u1 wa it'~ng po l'~cy. 156

As th e Wl.n.

,.

ter gave way to spring, it kept recalling to its readers the
seriousness of the situation.

It conjectured that Carranza's

hope of remaining in power depended on Wilson's reelection.
Then, in June, the

Tablet~~

attack took on new vigor as the

two governments ostensibly drew further and further apart.
When the Administration momentarily checked the

official

pressure on Carranza, the Tablet rolled its tongue in its
cheek and ventured to explain that tlpolitics has delayed this
week the development of a crisis ••• The National Democratic

....

Convention is in session".157
Mexico continued to defy Wilson, and the Tablet
became openly disgusted at the President's willingness to be
insulted. 158 The clash of Carranza's and Pershing's troops,
however,

s~emed

destined to force Wilson to declare war.

With condescension varied only by acrimony, this paper
155
156
~57

158

Jan. 4, 1916.
Jan. 11, 1916.
April 29, 1916.
June 17, 1916.

as~ured

.'
the President of Catholic
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loyalty and support:

Wi th all your fault s, we
Catholics will stand by you ••• chief
of which was forgetting what yesterday's pol icy was ......'you c ouldn' t
keep us out of war wl~ the temporary truce you made •
••• The newspaper men know, of
course, that he never had a policy
••• He tried to keep us out of war
only to plan us into it.
If you had known what was in
the back of your mind in the several yesterdays of Villa, Carranza,
Embargo, Vera Cruz, Blockade, John
Lind, and other silent Murphys,
the country would not be today in
the mess of your meddling.
We Catholics,will fight for
you against Catholics because it
just happ ens that you are, thanks
be to God, only a few months more
President of the country of whic!s9
we Catholics are loyal citizens.
If one reads the other Catholic papers during the same

period~

however, the Tablet appears far less radical, for even the
~.2.1:.is

Review accused the President of lying in "his con-

demnation of reports to be false •••which he knew well to be
true".160
~lthough

the most serious threat of war was averted

in July, the Mexican disorder grew worse.

Most of the

Catholic papers had given up all hope of Presidential action.
The
159
160

Sac~~d ..!!eart

lleview in a defeatist a tti tude complained

July 1, 1916.
July 11, 1916.

.'
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that Carranza's influenge was greater in Washington than in
161
his own country.
The Catholic Press protests declined in
number.

The terrible reality of abandoning the Mexicans com-

......

pletely to the Constitutionalists, however, inspired the
Mari~

to write a

f~nal

~

series of editorials in a spirited de-

nunciation of Wilson and his dreaded Pilicy.

More and more

each editorial bared the rancor concealed in its heart; sarcasm developed into bitterness; disgust turned into despair
of governmental action. 162 With the November 4th issue the
series concluded with a summation of its previous arguments
and reached a climax in a stinging rebuke aimed at the
••• attempts of interested politicians to defend the Administration ••• which are as futile as
they are dishonest ••• That the
present Administration is largely
responsible for existing conditions in Mexico is a fact of
which the proofs are superabundant ••• Effort to conceal them is
an insult to an intelligent
voter ••• By recognizing Carranza
••• the Administration incurred
the responsibility for Mexican
anarchy - a responsibility which
no am~~t of whitewashing can remove.

'"

Although judged by the final results, the combined
161
162
163
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Nov. 4, 1916.
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efforts of the Catholic press seemed to have influenced Wilson relatively little, nevertheless, as

l~ng

as he was a

presidential candidate for reelection in 1916, its comments
caused him many a sleepless night, if -the Tumulty incident is
an index.

As a matter of fact this concerted disapproval of

the President's policy did cause many good simple Catholics

•

to wonder if in conscience they could vote for one who had
aided a persecutor of the Church.
~iex

The Baltimore Catholic Re-

took great pains to make clear that while it was permis-

sible to vote for President Wilson, yet this did not prove
the Catholic press' protest against Wilson's unjust Mexican
164
policy wrong or unreasonable.
Nor was it unusual to find
some small town Republican politician exploiting this gold
mine for potential votes.

Such tactics, as far as the Fort-

.....

Review could predict, would hurt the Church more than
165
it could possibly help it.
The Brooklyn ,Iablet, hovlever,

B~ghtly

with no sympathy for the Democratic leader, quietly slipped
I

into an editorial on Mexico the suggestion that tfCarranza's
arrogant demands ••• may hurt Wilson on election dayn.166
Woodrow Wilson, though, was reelected, and the
Catholics still received little consolation from his foreign
164
165
166
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March 15, 1916.
Oct. 7, 1916.

148
policy.

The Michigan

Cathol~q

recorded that "the re-election

of President Wilson has caused the calamity howlers to wail.
Another four years of Woodrow Wilson's policies is not pleas. '.
167
ing to those who would provoke our ne!ghbors tt •
In his efforts to write off the whole Mexican headache Wilson gave

.

recognition to Carranza on March 3, 1917, while distant
thunder of V{orld War cannons drowned out the vo ice of protest.
~rics,

nevertheless, like Banquo's ghost, returned to haunt

Wilson and his colleagues; and yet it was more terrifying,
for its editor still had a voice, a prophetic voice:
All Americans who are not
Democratic know that a particularly savage revolution has been
in progress for several years •••
The Democrats will learn this
fast as soon as
Republicans
get into office.

igg

The Republicans eventually did take over the reins
of government, but the damage had been done.

Unfortunately,

all the Catholic press' prophecies of tyranny and destruction
were fulfilled to the letter.

From these experiences, the

rather mild Catholic press of the turn of the century gradu~

ally discovered it had a voice.

Unlike the secular press,'"

though, its editors denounced government actions according to
the norm of absolute prinCiples, rather than submission to a
167
168

Nov. 16, 1916.
April 7, 1917.

party line.

Although~the

Catholic press ultimately failed

to prevent Wilsonts recognition of Carranza, it did force
him to make some honest efforts to try to procure religious

....

;

as well as political liberty for the Mexican people.

....

0"

CONCLUSION
United States diplomacy

is.~sically

related to

the protection and enforcing of American rights.

These in-

terests and rights, in turn, have been concerned chiefly
with territorial desires, trade, comme:ce, economic development and the protection of lives and property.

In Mexico,

the dominant interest of the United States between 1821 and
1850 was territorial; after the Civil War, emphasis changed,
and the dollar bill motivated the economic penetration of
our citizens into Mexico.

Under Diaz, foreign capital and

colonists were so encouraged that Mexico by 1910 was in the
process of becoming Americanized.
As a result of the enormous economic stake which
our citizens have in this neighboring land, the United
States has an important responsibility in the protection of
those interests.

These interests and rights as a rule have

been most favored in Latin America, wherever a strong executive has wielded the big stick to stabilize his

government~

The threatened collapse of the Diaz regime, therefore, offered a direct challenge to our government.

Under the cir-

cumstances, the Taft Administration contemplated direct in150

151
tervention to check the rising current of revolution.

The

presence of our troops on the border to awe the rebels into
submission was as useless as tissue paper used to check a
whirling spring flood, for Madero

at the

moment was riding

high on the crest of the wave of popularity_

By 1910, the

disintegration of the political dam prftecting the Diaz regime was too great to stem the tide of economic and social
upheaval.

Taft had to bow to the inevitableMadero, unfortunately, was a weak executive, and

it was counter to the best interests of the United states to
tolerate him very long.

The diplomacy of the United states

between 1911 and 1913 was at best one of half-hearted support.
Daily, it became more evident that the Department of state
would have preferred a stronger individual at the head of the ....
Mexican government, and would welcome a change. The greatest
complaint against Madero, however, came from Ambassador Wilaon who had little use for-the Mexican President.

Henry L.

Wilson actively looked around for the "strong executive tt ,
whom he foqpd in General Felix Diaz and General Victoriano
Huerta.

When the disaffection in the army grew - an indica-

tion of the doom of any administration in Mexico - Wilson,
translating the desires of the State Department most literally, gave his support to that element in Mexico, which he

152

believed would be most
interests.

~likely

to support American economic

Accordingly, he overstepped the bounds of his

.

functions as a diplomat and actively took part in the counter..,

revolution which caused the overthrow of Madero's Administration.
When President 'flilson assumej office in March 1913,
he represented the antithesis of the policies pursued by Taft.
The new President had an aversion to "dollar diplomacy!', and
economic penetration; he was deeply suspicious of Ambassador
Wilson.

liis policy towards Mexico, therefore, was to be to-

tally at variance with the previous administrations from
Hayes to Taft.

Since he would not tolerate the sanctioning

of ttmilitary despotism" in the interests of American economic
and financial expansion, he attempted to overthrow the
ufrankenstein" creation (Huerta) of American diplomatic policy, as he called it.

At the same time, Wilson attempted to

introduce "democracy" in a country which had never known the
meaning of the word, but, by destroying the "strong" force in
Mexico, Wilson inevitably weakened commercial and economic
interests in the country.
The crucial mistake made by President Wilson was to
oversimplify the Mexican revolution itself.

The President

narrowed down the conflict to a struggle between democracy and

153

despotism, whereas the revolution was a product of numerous
diverse tendencies, which has little to do with democracy as
such.

A number of factional leaders, jealous of each other's

power, pushed forward distinct and
revolutionary programs.

.

~~times

conflicting

It was inevitable that American in-

.

tervention, which supported one faction, would cause deep and
lasting hostility among the other rival factions.
precisely what happened.

This is

The deep and lasting stain, though,

that further blotted the record of the Wilson Administration,
resulted from supporting a faction led by barbarous bandits.
The net result of Wilson's policies in Mexico,
therefore, was to weaken the country further, prolong the
revolutionary disturbances, intensify the Catholic persecution, and create chaos worse confounded.

In the long run,

American interests and rights were sacrificed.
Such significant events naturally furnished the
daily papers with spectacular headline and editorial fodder
for years.

The same was true also of the religious press.

From the very first reports of the revolution, there were
some Protestant papers which carried the "story".

In the ..'

dawning days of the twentieth century the Protestant weeklies
had large circulations and played an important part in influencing every day life.

These papers coul4 be found in the

.'

154

city alum, the

suburban~

mansion, or country farm.

large city daily envied the circulation of a

p~er

Many a
like the

Qhrist1m! Herald of New York which sold Over a million copies
weekly; many a small

.
.....
denominational paper printed

editorials

that were accepted dogmatically by its readers.
The paper's policy was generilly determined by the
editor independent of any Church hierarchy.

For example, the

Southern Methodist Quarterly Review soundly condemned Diaz,
while the northern Methodist brethren represented by the
Christian Advocate predicted true greatness of the same man;
and the Watchman was practically oblivious of the crisis
south of the border until it became affiliated with another
Baptist weekly, the Examiner.

There were two factors, how-

ever, that did influence these editors:

The incipient

Protestant missionary movement into Latin America, and their
foe, Catholicism.

Any leader that favored Protestant activ-

ity was championed as the saviour of the Mexican nation.
This factor helps to explain the fulsome praise of Diaz by
the Baptist. and Presbyterian papers, whose missionaries were
actively engaged in this southern republic, and when Madero."
officially let it be known that CathOlics would receive no
favors, his Protestant support, too, notably increased.

Al-

though Huerta's despotism in itself' was cause f'or opposition,
several editors considered his Faith an added crime.

This

was one of' the reasons President Wils,on' s anti-Huertan pol.icy found favor in the

Protest~t

press, but as long as his

diplomatic measures seemed destined to end in war, whole
hearted backing was withheld.

It was

~nly

natural, though,

that the Presbyterign Banner would be in full agreement with
Woodrow Wilson, a church member, yet by the time of Carranza's
recognition, most of the weeklies were just as expressive of'
their approval of'.the President's diplomatic measures.

In

justice, theref'ore, one might claim a very definite relation
between the almost unanimous Protestant praise of Wilson's
recognition of Carranza and the equally unified Catholic disgust and opposition to the same policy.

By 1916, though, the

White House Executive had alienated some of' his Protestant
f'riends.

And yet one might wonder whether the Baptist papers,

the Watchman-Examiner and the Standarg, abandoned the Wil.sonian machine near election time out of' sheer exasperation
with the bungling results of the President's policies, or be0"

cause the other

presidenti~l

candidate, Charles Evans Hughes,

was a devout Baptist.
A more objective treatment of the whole question,
however, was attained by those papers, which did not repre-

~

4,~56

sent an active missionary interest in Mexico.

On this score,

the policy'of the Congregationalist Independent deserves notice.

Its isolationist stand througpout these hectic years

was paralleled only by the pacifist policy of the Catholic
§,gcred Heart Review.

Except for the Tampico incident and

the war clouds that gathered after Ca.ranza's recognition,
when t he President was severely rebuked by the Independenj;;
for his frequent diplomatic blunders, ita loyalty to Wilson
could never be questioned.

Such a paper with no int erests

at stake could afford to take an independent stand, if the
occasion demanded.
For sheer influence, though, the most powerful of
all the Protestant papers was probably the undenominational
Christian gerald of New York
million people weekly_

~hich

was read by at least two

Since it was undenominational, no one

Protestant sect was patronized or unduly favored in its editorial columns to the offense of other Churches.

Thus, its

policy in the early stages of any question was generally
conservatiV"e until it could ascertain which wa:y the wind blew
for the majority of the Protestant brethren.

It followed in

saluting Diaz; then it recognized the leadership of Madero;
it attacked Huerta; the editor held back momentarily in endorsing Wilson's Mexican poliey, but eventually stepped in
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line, and by t he time Carranza was recogn ized, few more extreme backers could be found.

The paper literally was a slow

starter, but a strong finisher.

....

Although the Protestant press had no doctrinal
unity to hold it together, in the maj'or issues of the Mexican
crisis, such as the resignation of Hutfrta and the recognition
of Carranza, there was a fairly consistent and unified front.
On

the one hand, in view of the difference of opinion on

Diaz and other questions of world interest where religion was
not directly involved, and on the other hand, in c'ons ideration of the almost universal anti-Catholicltrend characteristic of all the Protestant papers of this day, one could not
go far wrong in holding that the editors favored far less
\'1ilson's "watchful wai tinglf policy in itself than the anti-

-

Catholic eftects it would bring about.
The Mexican question, however, was of even more importance to the Catholics of the United States than to Protestants, for the Mexican Catholics were the scape-goats of
the

anti-cl~rical

revolutionists_

Religion then, rather than

."

politics, explained the ever-mounting interest and eventually
the 1 iberal editorial space given to the Mexican chaos in the
Catholic press_
1

This position became evident beyond all doubt

ct. author's note at the end ot Chapter Two.
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with the America editor's statement of the paper's Mexican
policy which would have been unanimously accepted by the
Catholic press:

....

The Mexican problem has a
triple aspect, political, economic and religious. The last
aspect only has been our concern. 2
•
This factor helps explain the silence of the early revolutionary days, when the religious issue was not of paramount
importance to the revolutionists.
weeklies like America,

~

With the exception of

Maria, and the Sacred

B~~rt Revie~,

coverage of strictly religious and local events characterized
the news of the Catholic papers.

The discovery of the pro-

verbial needle in the haystack would be more likely than a
strong editorial policy which might involve the ce.nsoring of "..
a political move by these latter type weeklies.

It was only

after the Catholic press became conscious of the seriousness
of our southern neighbors' troubles, that it found time to
reflect on the Madero uprising and pass judgment •.
ihe Catholic and Protestant press began definitely
to part ways over the question of Huerta's recognition.
many of the Catholic papers, such as the

~tholic ~

."

Yet
and

the Baltimore Catholic Review, still refrained from opposing
2

America, Nov. 21, 1914.

Wilson's anti-Huerta policy, since they feared the Church
would be tarred for its lack of patriotism if the Catholic
press were politically found out of
few Democratic papers, too, like the

~ine;

and there were a

~atholic

Telegraph that

had a child's faith in the President's ttwatchful waiting"
stand.

The President's appointment,

~ough,

of unfit and

anti-Catholic special personal representatives was fast wearing away any bonds of fear or loyalty which held a paper to
support the existing policies.

Yet when one considers the

relatively large number of Catholic papers and periodicals,
in the first days of 1914 there were few editorials dealing
with the Mexican situation.
Then, the Tampico incident occurred.

The interest

of the whole Catholic press was aroused overnight.

Suddenly -

its headlines and editorial pages became alive to the reality
of the Mexican crisis.
ignored.

The threat of war could no longer be

In the initial stages of the new crisis Wilson

seemed to have scorid a definite triumph as one after the
other of
war call.

th~se

The Catholic Review, the Brooklyn Tablet, the

~holic R~w~,

ation.

papers vied to acknowledge its support of his

."

were just some of these promising 100% cooper-

Yet a few editors did not feel their patriotism was

compromised by protesting against an avoidable war.

Hence-

.'
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forth, the Mexican muddle provided important material for the
Catholic press.
That the Catholic Press,

a~ a
.. ..,

whole, sincerely de-

sired peace was evidenced in the enthusiastic welcome given
to the offer of ABC Mediation Board.
opening wedge for many of the papers

It also served as the
~

oppose Wilsonts war-

provoking measures, which had been supported the previous
month.

As the year wore on and the notorious "watchful wait-

ing" policy failed to heal. the Mexican wound, an impatient
note seeped into the editorial columns.

Wilsonts open ap-

proval of Villa and Carranza proved too much even for the
most loyal paper.

The cry of protest could now be heard in

England, along the Atlantic coast from Maine to Florida,
across the plains of the Middle West, even up in the Rockies
where its echo reached Canada.

~

The Catholic opposition in-

creased proportionately to the Wilson Administration's patronage of Carranza.

With Carranzats recognition, several papers

felt it their duty as loyal citizens to assure the President
of their acquiescence.

When the true significance, though,

."
of this strange recognition became evident, and loyalty meant
handling the hatchet that was hacking the Mexican Church to
death, ',Vilson looked in vain for Catholic support.

,

.'
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Woodrow Wilson suddenly awoke to the power of the
Catholic press, as he saw his chances for reelection gradually vanishing as smoke in a summer breeze. The wild Tumulty
.
scheme revealed his hidden fear. 3 Btt this plan merely further deepened the Catholic disgust with the President's handling of the Mexican issue.

The

Fortniihtl~

Review, the

~

tension, and others branded t'he effort as a cheap campaign
,

trick.

Villa's untimely raids on American property and life

helped little in raising Wilson's political stock.

In con-

trast with the Protestant press, the Chief Executive would
find it hard to discover one friend among the Catholic editors.

In fact, the Hichiggn Catholic and Brook1xn Tablet,

to mention a few, openly counselled his defeat at the polls.
The entrance of the United States into the World
War I buried the Mexican fiasco in complete oblivion for the
time.

Wilson thought he washed his hand of the whole affair

by granting de jur! recognition to Mexican President.
then turned the spotlight on Europe.

He

The sincere patriotism

of the Cathplic press was proved by the diversion of its attention from the Mexican chaos to the new world wide crisis.

------3

Tumulty was Wilson's private secretary, who in a letter
to a friend attempted to justify the President's Mexican
policy. Confer, Chapter III, 41-43.
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A set policy of the Catholic press is manifest it
one includes the whole era of

19~O-19l7.

In the early revo-

lut.ionary days when a minimum of the ,religious element was
involved, opinion was divided.

But when the Church and just-

ice began to suffer as a direct result of Wilson's policy,
the opposition of the press then

beca~

unified.

Those pa-

pers, which abandoned their pacifist policy to demand intervention, did so on the grounds that it was the only means for
Wilson to unentangle the Mexican net knotted by his previous
meddling.

Nowhere could the opinion of the Catholic press

after 1914 be more compressly found than in the words of
Ameri£.§::
Under ordinary circumstances
the Mexican would and should have
taken care of their troubles themselves. In this instance, however, our Government, no doubt
with the best intentions, made itself sponsor for the Constitutionalist party, thereby incurring
certain duties. Among these not
the least is the duty both ot
righting the wrongs and of preventing further crime. Unspeakably frightful crimes, wanton
enough to make strong men shudder
with horror, have been committed
against priests, Sisters and lay
people; and America feels that in
justice both to itself and to
American citizens who abhor brutality, our Administration should

....
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bring every possible moral pressure to bear upon the Mexican
criminals, who have time and time
again said that they are acting
4
under the authority ot Washington.
;p ...,

After Carranza's recognition, though, the Catholic
cause seemed lost, while the Protestant press was convinced
that the right course had been

follow~.

Yet that either of

these presses had been able to exert any influence during
Wilson's Administration is remarkable, and can best be explained perhaps by the willingness of many of the readers to
follow their editor's policies, because of the religious denominational affiliation of the paper.

For with a few excep-

tions such as America, Month, and the Christian Herald, the
ma.0ority of papers and periodicals would be classified just
above the level of amateur journalism.

Since almost all

these weeklies were limited in appeal to their own dioceses,
they were by that fact condemned to small circulations and
small revenue, and were thus barred from doing outstanding
work.

By and large they were edited by small and poorly paid

staffs

tha~were

.

usually grossly overworked and had little

time and energy for concentration on important matters or for
striving after journalistic perfection.

They seldom at-

tempted to maintain professional journalistic standards, while
4

Americ~,

Nov. 21, 1914. The underlined words were
italicized in the original text.
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religious prejudice led them oftentimes into slanting their
news stories, or mixing editorial comment with news.

They

also overpraised the mediocre, so when
. a Churchman or a Church
;,.

...

institution did something outstanding, there were no words
left to appraise it.

Their editorials frequently showed signs

of haste, and too often were superfici,l and wordy; too often,
also, these editorials generated more heat than light.

With

few exceptions, the Catholic organs appeared to be on the de-,
fensive, when they should have been on the offensive.

As a

group they sought to interest only Catholics, when their true
success as a pressure organ to influence the State depended on
their reaching the non-Catholics and godless.
However, had the religious press, in spite of its
weakness, been united, the world might well have witnessed a
forward step in modern Church and State relations, for Wilson
almost revamped his Mexican policy at the insistence of
Catholic.--if not out of respect for justice, at least due to
the spectre of a solid religious bloc opposing him at the
polls.

Butathe support of the Protestant press relieved the
.«
pressure enough to enable the President to continue his policy and recognize Carranza.

The Catholic press then had to

rest content with the thought that the Washington Administration had at least respected its suggestions to the extent of

_

.'
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promising that Carranza's recognition would depend in some
way on the guarantee of religious liberty.

However, as time

proved the worthlessness of Carranza's
. guarantees, and the

.....

tragic truth of the Catholic press' predictions of the tyranny, political upheaval and economic collapse consequent on
such a recognition, the state

perhaps~ust

have regretted

the deaf ear it turned towards the Church's pleas_

EPILOGUE
The publication of the

Zi~rman

.,...., .

note followed by

our entrance into World War I convinced the Mexicans of t!J.e
folly of a German-Japanese-Mexican alliance.

Nevertheless,

Carranza and his Constitutionalists ma~e it extrem~ly difficult for the United States to obtain sadly needed resources
for our war effort.

Re12.tions were strained and the termin-

ation of the war made it possible to attempt forcing our
Mexican brethren into line again.
vention arose and for a
American capital".

If

Strong demands for inter-

new regime more complacent to

In September, 1919, the Fall Committee

released its reports on the investigation

o~

Mexican affairs.

The se reports, wh ich fi lIed two huge volumes, rep resented an appeal for a drastic Mexican policy.

Lansing appeared to be

so drawn over to the side of Senator Fall and his group,
which were behind the interventionist drive, that his impatience wi th President Wilson's policy became quite noticeable.

...
Lansing's opportunity came when sorm body in north-

ern Mexico seized William

o. Jenkins, the consular agent of

the United States at Puebla.
manded his immediate release.

The Secretary of State deThe Mexican government re166

..
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sponded with a request for a delay, pending a judicial investigation.

Intervention grew imminent.

A resolution was

drafted approving the "Action of the, Department of state in
reference to the pending controversylt, and a demand for
severance of all relations with Mexico.

The resolution was

iwnediately referred to the Senate an' to the Committee of
Foreign Relations.

'Nilson, who was now seriously ill, got

wind of what was happening and called a halt to the move for
intervention.

Fortunately, Jenkins was released and the

crisis passed without any mishap.l
In 1920, the Republican Party came forward in vigorous defense of American investments.

Its campaign program

promised to prosecute American claims energetically.

It was

at this critical juncture that Carranza was overthrown b y ·...
Alvaro Obregon, and the agitation for intervention died dovm.
By the end of 1921, President Wilson's Mexican policy had run its cow·se.
policy.
i t

Fundamentally, it was a misguided

Instead of stimulating friendship and cooperation,

prolong~d

the Mexican revolution, and deepened the sus-

picion of Mexico as well as the other South American Republics of the ends and purposes of the United States.

In the

final analysis, therefore, Wilson's policies, although well
1

Rippy, 358-364.

,
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intentioned and sincere, must be written down as a complete
failure.
These events literally fulfilled the tragic forecasts of the Catholic press, and revl£led the wisdom of its
stand against the recognition of an anti-clerical government.

.

When the Protestant interests also began to suffer serious
setbacks under Carranza's new Constitution, many of the
Protestant papers began to echo the Catholic press' protests.
For many, the halo of Woodrow Wilson now was no longer discernible.

.-
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APPENDIX
Author's Note:
In treating of the opinian-of the Protestant Press,
we omitted the frequent and abusive accusations against the
Catholic Church as the cause of Mexic,o's trouble, except in

•

a few instances where the charges directly concerned some
issue of the United States'

p~licy,

e.g., in the recognition

of Carranza.
For the sake of interest, however, a sample of some
of these charges is included below:
Not until the horrible oppression 0 f the ruling class and
the superstitious teachings of
the corrupt Roman Catholic Church
are overcome by the spread of intelligence and of a pure form of
Christianity, the light of knowledge, even though but a feeble
glimmering at first, superseding
the thick darkness of the people,
may we hope to see fair play and
honest elections, and good government. Until then, we should
not expect too much.
Watchman-Examiner., •• Jan. 29, 1914.
Whenever the Constitutionalist army is victorious, one of
its first acts is to close the
Catholic Churches, confiscate the
convents and advise the priests
and nuns to leave the country.
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Harsh treatment? Certainly.
But these men know what they
are about. They know from
their own personal experiences and national history
when the Catholic Church is
in power ••• lt is the.aesire
of Rome that Mexico become
part of the United States.
What, then, are we to do?
Let us do all in our power
to assist the Presiden\ in
his present policy of peace.
Christ~ Century ••• Aug. 27, 1914.
The land baron and the
priest have continued their
unholy alliance to keep the
people in ignorance, superstition, and debt.
Christian g!ntury ••• Mar. 26, 1914.
Although the Catholic press usually ignored these
bigoted accusations, periodically an editor felt that truth
~d

justice demanded a rebuttal.

A representative reply is

found in the pamphlet, The ~ of B!Q, .!aE4 Yellow, penned by
the then Monsignor Kelley, editor of the monthly, Extension.
But we have, alasl by our own
greed and our prejudice, made
government a scorn and insult;
of the old schools, that once
were glorious, barracks and
ruins. We listen and applaud
when the ttliberals" of every
camp tell us that the Church
is responsible for poverty, ignorance and lawlessness; but

•

we do not listen to the Church
which gave to Mexico all the
civilization she possesses,
when she makes this gentle
plaint over the noise of murder, debauchery and . 1.ust: You
blame me for poverty,.... yet you
took from me the endowments
for my hospitals, my orphanages,
my countless works of mercy.
You blame me for ignorance when
you closed my schoo1st stole my
colleges and suppressed my universities, which first lit the
torch of learning among this
people. You say I have added
nothing to science and art, but
you destroyed the art I brought
with me, burned my books and
scattered the results of my labor for science to the four
winds of heaven. You blame me
for ignorance after forbidding
me for fifty years to teach.
You blame me for lawlessness,
when you destroyed my missions
among a peaceful and thriving
Indian population, and gave, in
my place to the people, the
thirty pieces of silver with
which you bribed them to murder
their fellows. You took the
cross out of their hands to replace it with a torch and a gun.
Show me one good thing in Mexico I did not give you. Show
me one genius for whom I was
not responsible. Show me one
step in advance I did not help
you to take. Cut away from
your country all that I put in
it, and see what remains. You

.'
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may thrust me out, exile my
bishops, murder my priests,
again steal my schools, desecrate my sanctuaries and my
virgins, but you cannot blot
our history, you c,~ot erase
the mark I have left on you not in a century of centuries.
F~ancis

Clement Kelley, The ~ of ~
Slon Press, Chicago, 1917, 73.
•

~~
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